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Certttube 



A STUDY IN PHILOSOPHY 



BY 



REV. ALOYSIUS ROTHER, S.J. 

PROFESSOR OF PHILOSOPHY IN ST. LOUIS UNIVERSITY 



ST. LOUIS, MO., i 9 ii 

Published by B. Herder 

17 South Broadway 

freiburg (baden) i london, w. c. 

Germany 68, Great Russell Street 



^1 



NIHIL OBSTAT 
Sti. Ludovici, die i. Oct. 1910 

R. J. Meyer, SJ. 

Praep. Prov. Missour. 



NIHIL OBSTAT 
Sti. Ludovici, die 25. Nov. 1910 

F. G. Holweck, 

Censor Librorum. 



IMPRIMATUR 
Sti. Ludovici, die 25. Nov. 1910 

*i* Joannes J. Glennon, 

A?-chiepiscofius Sti. Ludovici. 



Copyright, 191 1, by Joseph Gummersbach 



Becktold Printing: and Book Mfe. Co.. St. Louis. Mo. 



£,C!.A2S0f>5? 



CONTENTS 



CHAPTER i. 

\ PAGE 

INTRODUCTORY NOTIONS— Ignorance, Com- 
plete and Partial, Privative and Negative — 
X Doubt, Negative and Positive — Opinion — Sus- 
picion — Certitude — Certitude merely Subjective, 
and Certitude at once Subjective and Objective 
— Certitude, Metaphysical, Physical and Moral 
— Certitude, Absolute and Hypothetical — Certi- 
tude, Natural and Philosophical I 



CHAPTER 2. 
REQUISITES FOR CERTITUDE. 

Article i. First Requisite for Certitude: As- 
sent to Truth 20 

Article 2. Second Requisite for Certitude: 
Infallible Motives 26 

Article 3. Third Requisite for Certitude: 
Evidence of the Infallibility of the Motives 29 

CHAPTER 3. 
PROPERTIES OF CERTITUDE. 

Article 1. Metaphysical Certitude Absolute 
Certitude 35 



CONTENTS. 

PAGE 

Article 2. Metaphysical Certitude the only Ab- 
solute Certitude 37 

Article 3. Physical and Moral Certitude, 
though Hypothetical, still True Certitude. . 40 

Article 4. Essential Grades of Certitude 70 

Section 1. Metaphysical Certitude Greater 
than Physical and Moral, and Physical 

Greater than Moral 70 

Section 2. The Three Orders of Certitude 

not Species Properly so Called 73 

Article 5. Accidental Degrees of Certitude. ... 81 
Alphabetical Index 93 



PREFACE 

The following pages present an 
exposition of Certitude accord- 
ing to the teaching of the 
Scholastics, and their purpose is 
to secure a greater esteem and 
love for the philosophy of St. 
Thomas Aquinas. 



CERTITUDE 

CHAPTER FIRST 

Introductory Notions 

Summary: States of mind falling short of certitude- 
Ignorance, complete and partial, privative 
and negative — Doubt, negative and posi- 
tive — Opinion — Suspicion — Certitude — Cer- 
titude merely subjective and certitude both 
subjective and objective — Certitude, meta- 
physical, physical and moral — Moral certi- 
tude in a wider sense — Certitude, absolute 
and hypothetical— Certitude, natural and 
philosophical. 

i. The inquiry into any new branch of knowl- 
edge should, according to Cicero's advice (de 
Officiis, 1. i. c. 2.), start out with a definition of 
the subject to be investigated, in order that we 
may clearly know what we are about to discuss. 

2. Definition of certitude. What then is 
certitude? It is ordinarily described as the firm* 
assent of the mind to a statement without any] 
fear of error. 

3. States of mind falling short of certitude. 
Before scrutinizing the above definition a little 

I 



2 Certitude 

more thoroughly, let us first note the various 
states of mind falling short of genuine certitude. 

4. Ignorance. When man comes into the 
world, his mind may be compared to a virgin 
page, or— as philosophers put it — to a "tabula 
rasa," that is, a smooth wax tablet upon which 
no inscription has as yet been made. This total 
absence of knowledge is ignorance. Little by 
little, impressions are made upon this tablet of 
the mind, becoming deeper and broader till fre- 
quently the knowledge acquired by the mind 
grows most varied and seemingly unlimited. 
However, finite intelligences, no matter how com- 
prehensive in their breadth of thought, will al- 
ways remain in ignorance of incomparably more 
than they know; for knowledge is infinite, and 
none but the Infinite can hold it all. 

Hence, ignorance may either be complete or 
partial. 

Again, ignorance is either a mere absence of 
knowledge, or it is the absence of such knowledge 
as a person, under given circumstances, is ex- 
pected to have. The former is technically known 
as negative and the latter as privative ignorance. 
Thus if the physician is not acquainted with 
farming, we have an instance simply of ig- 
norance: there is a mere negation — negative 
ignorance. But if he is not acquainted with 
matters the knowledge of which is called for by 
his profession, his ignorance is privative: there 



Introductory Notions 3 

is a privation of some knowledge that is due — 
privative ignorance. 

5. The mind's activity in the pursuit of its 
object, truth, may be compared to a journey, of 
which ignorance is the starting point, and cer- 
tainty the destination. 

6. State of doubt. The first stage in the 
route of travel is the state of doubt. When we 
say this, we do not mean to assert that the mind 
always passes first from a condition of ignorance 
to that of doubt. No, very often it takes a 
straight leap from ignorance to certain knowl- 
edge. Frequently, however, it is compelled to 
reach its destination by this roundabout way of 
doubt. 

Doubt is a state of intellectual suspense be- 
tween some statement and its opposite due to 
lack of evidence. In this state of doubt, the in- 
tellect views two or more ideas and compares 
them, but discovers no signs of their mutual 
relation or merely such slight ones as justify no 
positive judgment. Hence it remains undecided. 

Suppose a boy were to ask you whether the 
number of fish in the Mississippi River is odd 
or even, you would perhaps say to him, if you 
took him seriously at all, that as you had no 
reasons whatsoever for asserting either the one 
or the other, you could not tell. This kind of 
doubt, where there is a total absence of grounds 
for either side, is called negative. It is really 



4 Certitude 

not doubt at all, but rather ignorance in regard 
to the relation between two terms. For to doubt 
means to refuse assent on account of the insuffi- 
ciency of the motives advanced for a proposition 
and its opposite ; now in negative doubt, no mo- 
tives whatever are discernible. 

If the reasons for both of the opposite state- 
ments are very weak, doubt is likewise regarded 
as negative. 

It is termed positive, when there are, indeed, 
grounds for both alternatives worthy of some 
consideration, but none weighty enough to in- 
duce a man of ordinary prudence to give or re- 
fuse his assent. 

7. Opinion. If, on the other hand, sufficient 
reasons present themselves to justify the mind 
in embracing one of the two opposite statements, 
without, however, precluding the possibility of 
error on its part, then, should it venture on a 
judgment, it is said to form an opinion. This 
is the second stage on the road to certitude. 

Hence, opinion may be defined as an assent of 
the mind to one of two opposite views on grounds 
not altogether incompatible with error. It is 
wavering assent, synonymous with belief in one 
of its meanings. Thus Webster says, "Belief is 
used for persuasion or opinion, when evidence 
is not so clear as to leave no doubt." 

The grounds which give rise to an opinion, are 



Introductory Notions 5 

called its probability. For an opinion to be ra- 
tional, the reasons in its favor must be such as 
to move a prudent man to yield assent. It is not 
necessary that the grounds for the side embraced 
should preponderate. It is sufficient for them 
to be solid and sound, not light and delusive. 

8. Suspicion. There is still another condi- 
tion of mind on this side of certitude which 
might be regarded as a sort of bridge or tran- 
sition between doubt and opinion, namely suspi- 
cion. Suspicion, as here understood, is not the 
same as a rash judgment formed on flimsy 
grounds ; but as entering into philosophic investi- 
gation, it is regarded as a leaning or inclination 
of the mind to pronounce judgment for reasons 
insufficient in themselves, but which seem to 
point in the direction in which the truth lies. 
Suspicion, as thus taken, is really nothing else 
than a certain scenting or divining of the truth. 
It is but the struggling of the "ingenium curi- 
osum" in man, and an evidence of its restlessness 
and eagerness to soar aloft on the wings of 
thought. It gives rise to all manner of guesses, 
conjectures, hypotheses and theories, and thus 
often proves the fruitful mother of startling in- 
ventions. Hence in the purely intellectual re- 
gion, such surmises are laudable and to be 
encouraged, provided, of course, they do not 
run counter to any well established principle or 



6 Certitude 

fact. But in the practical concerns of life, sus- 
picions must be controlled by the dictates of a 
correct conscience. 

9. Certitude. We have now arrived at the 
destination of our journey, namely certitude. 
We described it, at the opening of the treatise, 
as the firm assent of the mind to some statement, 
without any fear of error. This definition of 
certitude does not necessarily import that assent 
is given to truth. As a matter of fact, it is pos- 
sible for the mind to adhere, without fear of 
error, not only to what is true but, even at times, 
to what is false. This seems puzzling and calls 
for an explanation ; it will be better, however, to 
defer this question to another place (No. 34) 
where we shall treat of the requisites for genuine 
certitude. 

The above definition of certitude then, is gen- 
eral, and applies to firm assent given to one of 
two contraries, whether the side adhered to, be 
true or false. 

10. First division of certitude. This leads 
us at once to the division of certitude into that 
which is merely subjective, and that which is 
both subjective and objective. 

Certitude regarded in itself, is, of course, sub- 
jective; for it is a state of mind. But this 
subjective state may have been caused by ob- 
jective truth, or it may be wholly due to the 
action of the intellect, unduly influenced by the 



Introductory Notions J 

will and deluded by the mere appearance of 
truth. If the origin of certitude is traceable to 
the former, i. e. to objective truth, certitude is 
called formal: if solely to the latter, i. e. to the 
subjective operation of the mind, it is styled 
purely subjective. 

This purely subjective certitude may be defined 
as unyielding assent to a proposition on grounds 
which do not make it evident that the possibility 
of the opposite is excluded; whilst formal certi- 
tude, on the other hand, is described as firm as- 
sent to truth on grounds which show its opposite 
to be plainly absurd. 

Formal certitude might not unsuitably be 
called genuine certitude, all the more so, as the 
ordinary meaning of our word "formal" suggests 
something quite different from the above techni- 
cal signification. 

We shall show further on, why this last kind 
of assent alone deserves to be dignified with the 
name of certitude properly so called. 

Purely subjective and genuine certitude, it will 
be noticed, agree in this, that both are qualities 
of the thinking mind, but they differ from each 
other in that the former has its source in the 
mind exclusively, whilst the latter is the result 
of the mind determined by objective truth. 

Objective certitude. Since we are allowed 
by metonomy to name the cause of a thing after 
the effect it produces, objective truth as giving 



8 Certitude 

rise to subjective certitude, has been termed ob- 
jective certitude. 

This so called objective certitude may be de- 
fined as objective truth manifesting itself to the 
mind in such a way as to compel assent. 

In this connection, let it be remarked that ob- 
jective truth as productive of firm assent should, 
if we wish to be exact in expression, be simply 
called "certainty," whilst the word "certitude" 
ought to be reserved for the subjective condition 
of the mind. Cardinal Newman in his "Gram- 
mar of Assent," p. 331, says: "Certitude is a 
mental state, certainty is a quality of a proposi- 
tion." Thus, we often hear people say, that such 
or such a thing is a certainty ; or that they accept 
some fact as an inevitable certainty. But we 
say, "Skeptics will admit no certitude," or, "We 
have no certitude of the hour of our death." 

However, this distinction is by no means al- 
ways observed. 

Let us illustrate the above definitions by a few 
examples. 

" t was the belief of men for ages that the earth 
was flat. This conviction of theirs was purely 
subjective certitude, as the reason for it, namely 
the mere sensible appearance of the earth, was 
not of a nature to exclude the possibility of the 
opposite, namely that the earth was not flat, but 
round. The form of the sun, moon and other 
heavenly bodies must have often created doubt 



Introductory Notions 9 

in the minds of the beholders, and should have 
set them to reconsider their hasty inference. 

And now let us take an instance of genuine 
certitude. 

We are firmly convinced that there is a Provi- 
dence, lovingly caring for us and directing and 
controlling all that exists. Our belief in this 
divine guidance is unshakable and moreover rests 
on grounds, namely the wisdom, goodness and 
love of God, which are incompatible with the 
contrary statement that there is no Providence. 
Here we have a clear exemplification of the firm 
assent resting on objective truth, that is, of genu- 
ine certitude. 

11. Second division of certitude. There is 
still another division of certitude, which by rea- 
son of its great importance claims our special 
attention. We defined (objective) certitude as 
truth manifesting itself to the mind in such a 
way as to compel assent. Now this manifesta- 
tion of the truth takes place through certain ob- 
jective grounds or reasons, which, however, are 
not all of the same general character; for there 
are essential differences amongst them. Accord- 
ing to these differences both certainty and certi- 
tude are divided into three classes, namely, tneta^ 
physical, physical and moral. 

12. Metaphysical certainty. A statement 
regarding some objective truth is said to be meta- 
physically certain, when it rests on grounds 



io Certitude 

drawn from the very essence of that truth and 
involved in its very idea; and since what is es- 
sential to a thing is altogether inseparable from 
it, it follows that the metaphysically certain im- 
plies absolute unchangeableness, such as is with- 
drawn from Almighty power itself. Thus, it is 
metaphysically certain that two and two are four, 
and not even God can bring about that they 
should not be four. 

The adherence of the mind to such truths con- 
stitutes metaphysical (subjective) certitude. It 
may be defined as assent to a statement on 
grounds with which its opposite is absolutely in- 
compatible. 

When we say that a statement is absolutely 
incompatible with certain motives, we mean that 
the truth of this statement together with the ex- 
istence of those motives would imply a contra- 
diction, that is to say, an affirmation and negation 
of the same thing. 

13. Physical certainty. Let us now pass on 
to physical certainty. 

A statement is said to be physically certain 
when its unchangeableness or permanent charac- 
ter, rests on the physical laws of nature. These 
laws, however, are subject to the controlling 
action of the Almighty power of God, as v. g. 
the law that a stone thrown into the air, if un- 
supported, will fall again to the ground. Hence 
it follows that physical certainty is hypothetical, 



Introductory Notions n 

being conditioned by the proviso, "if God does 
not interfere with the ordinary course of na- 
ture." 

The adherence of the mind to a physical fact 
consequent upon the perception of nature's uni- 
form mode of action is physical (subjective) 
certitude. It is defined as assent to a statement, 
on grounds with which its opposite is physically 
incompatible: that is to say, a statement made 
in opposition to nature's laws cannot become true, 
as long as these laws, which form the ground of 
assent, remain in force and are not suspended 
by the God of nature. 

These laws of nature, as will have been gath- 
ered from the foregoing, are forces residing in 
nature, in virtue of which physical agents — that 
is, agents not endowed with freedom — always 
and of necessity produce the same effect. It is 
to these forces that the uniformity and constancy 
of nature are due. 

Now let us throw a little more light on this 
subject by a few examples. It is contrary to 
the laws of nature, as known to us through legiti- 
mate induction, for a dead person to come back 
to life. These same inexorable laws make it 
impossible for a man to walk on the billows of 
the ocean without sinking, or to be shut up in a 
fiery furnace without being consumed. Hence 
any report that a dead man left the grave, or 
that some one walked on the water without being 

2 



12 Certitude 

submerged, or dwelt in the midst of flames un- 
touched, must be refused credence, unless it ap- 
pears clearly that it pleased God to suspend the 
laws of nature in some particular case for wise 
reasons of his own. 

14. Moral certainty. We now come to our 
last division of certainty, namely, moral cer- 
tainty. 

A statement is said to be morally certain, when 
the so called "moral laws" form the basis of its 
fixedness and unchangeableness. 

15. Meaning of moral laws. But before we 
go any further, we *must first explain what is 
meant by moral laws. 

Moral laws, as here understood, are certain, 
tendencies or propensities of free beings which 
prompt them always to act in a certain definite 
manner. True, they do not deprive the agent 
of his freedom : they leave it in his power to act 
counter to them. 

Yet, as these laws are not only most helpful 
but even indispensable to the well-being of the 
individual and the race, they are in such com- 
plete harmony with reason that no one can set 
them aside except by an extreme abuse of his 
free will and by doing violence to his rational 
self. They possess then a certain necessitating 
or compelling force, yet so that they can, abso- 
lutely speaking, be overruled by the will of man. 
But more about this further on. 



Introductory Notions 13 

They are called moral laws because they are 
impulses, guiding agents capable of moral ac- 
tions, and strengthening them in the performance 
of good. 

The name "law" as referred to these prompt- 
ings of man's rational nature is somewhat mis- 
leading. For by a law in the domain of morality, 
we generally understand a precept or command- 
ment. But the moral laws as the basis of moral 
certainty are not precepts as such; they are 
rather, as explained before, moral forces, tend- 
encies, proclivities, planted by God in man's na- 
ture, to help him to perform certain very impor- 
tant operations more readily and securely. In 
fact, they are called laws only, as bearing an 
analogy to physical laws. 

But as the phrase "moral laws" in the signifi- 
cation just given is very rare, and moreover not 
sanctioned by our standard dictionaries, we shall 
avoid it, and employ instead expressions in cur- 
rent usage having the same meaning, as "moral 
or human instincts," "natural bias," "tendency or 
inclination of free agents," and the like. 

From the above explanation we infer, that, 
like physical certainty, moral certainty is hypo- 
thetical, being dependent on the condition, that 
the free agent will not go counter to his rational 
instincts. 

We may then define moral (subjective) certi- 
tude as assent given to a statement, the opposite 



14 Certitude 

of which is incompatible with man's moral in- 
stincts. 

Let us, as before, illustrate our abstract defini- 
tions by a few concrete examples. 

The love of life, as long as life is a source of 
enjoyment, is one of these moral instincts. No 
one who is in good health and held in honor, will 
take his own life, though he can do so. 

Again, our correct natural inclinations urge us 
with irresistible power, not to maim or disfigure 
ourselves. Could you imagine a young man who 
is, moreover, rather vain of his appearance to 
slash himself with a razor? Yet, no one will 
deny that it is possible for him to do so. This 
love of keeping our bodies whole and intact, is 
another moral instinct, such as we described 
above. 

"Nemo gratis mendax," that is, no one lies 
just for the sake of lying, is also an instinct of 
this sort, governing the rational activity of man. 
People do tell many lies, no doubt; so many in 
fact, as to make the Psalmist say in his excess, 
"Every man is a liar." But they do not lie un- 
less some advantage accrues to them from this 
perversion of the truth. That the above dictum 
really embodies a human instinct, is also proven 
by the fact that every one considers it a great 
insult to be called a liar, and some resent it so 
much as to have recourse to violence. Yet there 
are found rare exceptions of moral depravity 



Introductory Notions 15 

who set at naught this sacred bias of human na- 
ture, by lying just for the sake of lying. 

"Parents love their children," is also accounted- 
an instinct of the moral order. The love of 
parents for their offspring is planted in their 
hearts by the Almighty himself. Taking our 
stand upon this instinct, we consider ourselves 
justified in forecasting the actions of parents in 
regard to their children. True, there are un- 
natural parents ; the very fact, however, that men 
call them unnatural, proves that they regard their 
conduct as opposed to nature. Thus the cor- 
rectness of our assertion stands confirmed by 
common opinion. 

16. It might be added here that not all the 
human tendencies are common to the entire race ; 
but some of them are restricted to certain condi- 
tions and stages of man's life. We can hardly 
make our meaning clearer than by citing a pas- 
sage from both Horace and Shakespeare, in 
which these great poets delineate the propensities 
and traits peculiar to certain states of human 
existence. Not all the characteristics set down 
by them as marking different periods of man's 
career, are moral instincts in the strict sense of 
the word; yet they bear at least a very striking 
resemblance to them, and thus serve as apt illus- 
trations of the matter under discussion. 

Thus Horace shows himself the keen observer 
and searching reader of the human heart that he 



1 6 Certitude 

is, by the portrait which he gives in "Ars Po 
etica" of the tendencies, likings and habits of the 
beardless youth. He says : 

"Imberbis juvenis, tandem custode remoto, 
Gaudet equis canibusque, et aprici gramine campi ; 
Cereus in vitium flecti, monitoribus asper, 
Utilium tardus provisor, prodigus aeris, 
Sublimis, cupidusque, et amata relinquere pernix." 

Shakespeare sets forth the traits of the School- 
boy, the Soldier and the Justice very tellingly in 
the following lines : 

"And then the whining School-boy, with his satchel, 
And shining morning face, creeping like snail 

Unwillingly to school 

Then a Soldier, 

Full of strange oaths, and bearded like a pard, 

Jealous in honor, sudden and quick in quarrel, 

Seeking the bubble reputation 

Even in the cannon's mouth. And then the Justice, 

In fair round belly with good capon lined, 

With eyes severe, and beard of formal cut, 

Full of wise saws and modern instances." 

It will have been seen from the examples above 
given, that to know the human instincts, 
(whether properly so called or in a looser sense) 
is to know human nature. A thorough acquaint- 
ance with them makes the good ruler who is to 
guide men, and the good poet and novelist who 
describe their manners. 

To guard against misapprehension, let it be 



Introductory Notions ij 

remarked that by human instincts in the looser 
sense, we understand mere whims or humors 
common to certain classes of persons, national 
traits developed by local conditions and the like. 

Bear also in mind that at present we are simply 
endeavoring to clear up our notions ; later on, we 
shall examine whether physical and moral certi- 
tude are genuine certitude. 

17. Moral certitude in the wider sense. 
The expression "moral certitude" is sometimes 
used in a somewhat different sense which we 
must notice, in order to avoid confusion. It 
often stands for what is highly probable, and 
may be denned, as assent to a proposition or. 
statement on grounds which render its truth 
highly probable without excluding the possibility 
of the contrary. Thus, if you send a letter or 
a parcel through the mail in a civilized country, 
you feel morally certain that it will reach its 
destination. You are also morally convinced 
that in a book of fair proportions, some printing 
mistakes will be found. 

This quasi-certitude is called "moral," because 
actions performed with such mental assurance as 
it can give us, are justifiable before the tribunal 
of conscience. 

Certainty of this kind might not unsuitably be 
called "prudential," since any measure taken in 
pursuance of it, must be regarded as prudent, 
that is to say, befitting a prudent man. 



1 8 Certitude 

1 8. Third division of certitude into absolute 
and hypothetical. There is still a further divi- 
sion of certitude to be noted, which is funda- 
mental in the study of philosophy, and especially 
in this question of certainty, namely, into abso- 
lute and hypothetical. 

Absolute certitude. A statement is said to be 
absolutely certain, when its truth is independent 
of any condition whatsoever. Certainty of this 
description is possessed by such propositions as 
the following: "God exists"; "Twice three are 
six"; "All the points of the circumference of a 
circle are equally distant from a point within 
called the centre." 

When we postulate independence "of any con- 
dition whatsoever," we, of course, mean condi- 
tions which are possible and conceivable ; for an 
impossible or inconceivable proposition must be 
regarded as non-existent. It might not be out 
of place to show by some examples how absolute 
propositions look, when yoked to an unthink- 
able condition. Here are two of them : "Three 
and three make six, provided three times three 
are not twelve;" or, "God is eternal, provided 
he did not begin to exist." It is plain that such 
senseless additions must be altogether set aside. 

Hypothetical certitude. A statement is hypo- 
thetically certain when its truth depends upon 
the fulfilment of some condition. Under this 
head fall all statements which are grounded on 



Introductory Notions 19 

the physical laws and the moral instincts, as, "A 
stone dropped into the water will sink to the 
bottom," or "This witness, well known for his 
uprightness will tell the truth, when cited to 
testify in court." For the first example is con- 
ditioned upon God not suspending the ordinary 
course of nature, and the second, upon man 
making a proper use of his free will. 

19. Fourth division of certitude into natu- 
ral and philosophical. Another division of cer- 
titude is that into natural and philosophical. 

Natural certitude is the mental assurance 
which every one of sound mind has in regard 
to many things, even without full advertence to 
the reasons why he is sure. The natural light 
of reason, even when unimproved by study and 
reflection, guides us safely in many things ; if not 
interfered with from without, it never leads us 
astray within its own sphere. 

Philosophical certitude is natural certitude per- 
fected by an accurate scrutiny of the grounds of 
assent. 

These two kinds of certitude do not differ es- 
sentially from one another. They are the same 
mental state in different stages of development; 
or, to express their dissimilarity in technical 
language, we might say that in natural certitude, 
the mind perceives the reasons for its firm con- 
viction indirectly or by implication, whereas 
when in possession of philosophical certitude, it 
knows the same reasons directly and explicitly. 



CHAPTER SECOND 

REQUISITES FOR CERTITUDE 

ARTICLE i 

First Requisite for Certitude, Assent to 
Truth 

Summary: Thesis: first requisite for certitude, assent 
to truth — An objection met — Proof of thesis 
— Truth the proper object of the intellect — 
Close connection between skepticism and 
the denial that assent to truth is required 
for certitude. 

20. After describing certitude and enumer- 
ating its divisions, we must now prove what 
certitude is; and this we shall do by showing 
that the definition of genuine certitude is not 
arbitrarily formed, but possessed of objective 
validity, or, in other words, that it is in agree- 
ment with reality. 

21. An objection met. An apparently seri- 
ous difficulty, however, confronts us at the out- 
set of our philosophical investigations. For, 
according to the statement just made, we intend 
to prove what certitude is ; but how is this possi- 
ble without begging the question? For we beg 

20 



Requisites for Certitude 21 

the question whenever we assume in the premises 
the very thing to be proved. Now the premises 
to be of any service in reasoning must be recog- 
nized as certain: hence to prove what certitude 
is, you must already know that it exists and what 
it is. 

We can meet this objection in two ways. In 
the first place, we can reply that we do not in- 
tend to give a proof or demonstration in the 
strict sense of the word, that it is our purpose^ 
merely to analyze certitude, and that in doing 
so, we adopt the external garb of the syllogism 
simply for the sake of clearness and convenience. 

But we have another answer in reserve: it is 
our aim here to give a philosophical definition 
of certitude, and we deduce this from what com- 
mon sense tells us about certitude. In other 
words, we base our scientific and philosophical 
knowledge of certitude upon natural certitude, 
and thus we can demonstrate our definition to 
be correct without laying ourselves open to the 
charge especially odious to philosophers, of beg- 
ging the question. 

22. Let us now restate the definition of certi- 
tude and point out that the elements involved in 
it, are based upon accurate observation and cor- 
rect analysis of the mental processes. 

True or genuine certitude is unflinching as- 
sent to truth from motives which show its oppo- 
site to be evidently absurd. 



22 Certitude 

A glance at this definition reveals at once that 
for certitude strictly so called three conditions 
must be fulfilled, namely, first, the mind's assent 
must be given to a statement which is true in 
itself ; secondly, this statement must be accepted 
by the mind on grounds with which its opposite 
is incompatible ; and thirdly, these grounds must 
manifest themselves to the intellect as evidently 
infallible. For the sake of clearness, let us em- 
body each of these requirements in a separate 
thesis. 

THESIS i 

In order to have certitude in the strict 
and highest sense of the word, the 
mind's assent must, in the first place, 
be given to a statement which is true 
in itself. 

23. Note that we speak here of certitude in 
the "strict" and "highest" sense of the word, 
where, by the former, we mean "genuine" certi- 
tude and, by the latter, "metaphysical." For, as 
we shall see further on, there can be certitude 
strictly so called, (viz. physical and moral), 
which, however, is not certitude in the highest 
sense of the term. 

24. We can derive the necessity of this essen- 
tial condition for perfect intellectual assurance 
from the fact admitted on all hands, that e'erti- 



Requisites for Certitude 23 

tude constitutes the perfection of the human in- 
tellect. It is the culmination, the acme of human 
cognition. It is the full repose of the mind in 
the possession of truth. This, in fact, might be 
called the definition of certitude as given by com- 
mon sense. For, a man of average intelligence 
will tell you, that he is certain when he has full 
assurance of something, and feels perfectly easy 
in mind in regard to its truth. Now it is im- 
possible that the intellect should experience such 
complete repose in giving assent to what is in 
itself false. For, it would then be at rest with- 
out being in possession of its own peculiar object, 
truth; and to say that any faculty can rest alto- 
gether satisfied when exercising its activity on 
an object not its own, is a contradiction in terms. 

The reason is this : Every faculty tends, of its 
very nature, towards its own object; as the will 
towards the good, the appetite towards food; 
for the object of a faculty is that to which its 
activity is directed. 

Now if it were possible for a faculty to find 
perfect satisfaction in an object not its own, it 
would thereby show itself indifferent and un- 
concerned in regard to its own object, since by 
the very fact of being attracted and engrossed 
by an object not its own, it ceases to tend to- 
wards its own. 

Hence a faculty of this sort would at once 
tend towards its own object — for otherwise it 



24 Certitude 

would not be a faculty at all — and it would not 
tend towards it ; for we assume it to be indiffer- 
ent towards its own object, because we suppose 
it capable of finding full repose in something 
besides its own peculiar object; and this would 
imply a patent contradiction. 

Let us corroborate this argument by a few 
well known facts of every-day experience, which 
go to show that the cravings of a faculty can 
never be appeased by an object not its own. 

The will — one of the faculties of the soul — 
is ill at ease so long as it clings to what is evil ; 
it never finds perfect satisfaction except in the 
good. For evil is not the proper object of the 
will. 

Grating sounds and false notes offend the 
trained ear, because they are out of keeping 
with it. 

Dreary surroundings, bleak fields, bare trees 
act depressingly on a person of fervid imagina- 
tion: for the fancy has not the object on which 
it loves to feed. 

Thus it is also with the intellect, since it, too, 
is one of man's faculties. It cannot feel at rest 
unless it possesses truth: for truth is its proper 
object. 

Whence it follows that assent to what is false 
cannot be certain: for certitude is the full re- 
pose, the full assurance of the mind. 

25. A query answered. But some one might 



Requisites for Certitude 25 

ask, perhaps, how do you know that the true 
is the proper object of the intellect, and the 
false is not? The answer to this question is 
given by self -consciousness, which takes notice 
of all the internal phenomena of our intellectual 
life. For our consciousness tells us, that we all 
love truth, that our reason devotes its energies 
to discovering it : whilst this same inner witness 
attests that we abhor falsity as an evil, that we 
fly from it, that we feel ashamed when caught 
blundering. 

Now this love of truth on the one hand, and 
detestation of falsity on the other, clearly show 
that the one is, and the other is not the object of 
the intellect. 

Moreover, it is evident a priori, that the false, 
which is a privation of a perfection, and hence 
an evil, cannot be the object of a faculty. 

26. Close connection between universal 
skepticism and denial that assent to truth is 
required for perfect certitude. To strengthen 
our thesis still more, we invite attention to the 
great importance of allowing no assent to be 
certain, unless given to what is true; for were 
we to yield this point, we should place skepti- 
cism on a dangerous vantage ground in its at- 
tack on the existence of certain knowledge, and 
thus play into the hands of our enemies. 

For if we could ever be truly certain of what 
is really a mistake, then certain and uncertain 



26 Certitude 

assent would not differ from one another, as far 
as objective truth is concerned, since both the 
one and the other could stand with falsity. 

Hence, certain assent would in reality be as 
uncertain as uncertain assent; and if so, how 
could we ever be sure of the truth ? We should 
have to admit that we could not ; we should have 
to surrender to the skeptics. 

If then we do not hold steadfastly to this 
point, that what is certain is likewise true, the \ 
fabric of knowledge is built on sand, and cannot 
endure. 

ARTICLE 2 

Second Requisite for Certitude, Infallible 
Motives 

Summary: Thesis: infallible motives required for cer- 
titude — Twofold character of grounds of 
assent — Proof of thesis. 

27. We cannot then be certain, unless our 
assent is given to truth. However, this is not 
enough for certitude. For it often happens that 
what we mentally acquiesce in, is true as a mat- 
ter of fact, yet we are not for that reason alone 
certain. Hence a further condition for the re- 
moval of all doubt is needed. Let us state this 
explicitly in the next thesis. 



Requisites for Certitude 27 

THESIS 2 

For the intellect to be certain in the 
strict and highest sense of the word, 
it is not enough that the statement ad- 
hered to, be true; it must moreover 
be accepted on grounds with which its 
opposite is incompatible. 

A few expressions in this thesis need clearing 
up, before we can pass on to the proof. 

The grounds of a statement are, of course, the 
reasons that can be brought forward to show its * 
truth. These reasons may be of a twofold char- 
acter. They may either merely indicate that a 
statement is so without, however, excluding the- 
possibility of the opposite; or, they may, in ad- 
dition, make it appear that this possibility is 
excluded. It is reasons of the latter kind which 
we require for genuine certitude ; those of the 
first description only give rise to assent more or 
less probable. 

Let us illustrate our meaning by an example. 
Suppose you see a rabbit stretched out in the 
grass ; you raise it up : it neither breathes nor 
stirs ; you pass your hand over its body : it feels 
cold to the touch. You say, it is dead. 

But are you justified in pronouncing this judg- 
ment? Are your grounds for your assertion 
such as to exclude its contradictory? I answer 

that they are not. For it is possible for an ani- 
3 



28 Certitude 

mal which neither breathes nor stirs, and feels 
cold to the touch, to be still alive. Perhaps it 
is merely stunned. But suppose you notice, that 
the rabbit has been shot through the head or the 
heart, or that it is beginning to decay, then the 
grounds for your judgment that the rabbit is 
dead would be incompatible with its contradict- 
ory, namely, that the animal is not dead. 

In order to have genuine certitude, the reasons 
for assent must be of this kind. 

Let us now pass to the proof of the thesis, 
namely, that a statement in order to be certain, 
must be accepted by the mind on grounds with 
which its opposite is incompatible. In other 
words, the reasons for certain assent to a propo- 
sition must exclude the possibility of error. 

28. This second condition for certain assent 
is an immediate inference from the first requisite 
for perfect certitude, namely, that nothing short 
of truth can fully satisfy the mind. Now it is 
only a statement resting on motives incompatible 
with its contradictory that is necessarily true. 
Hence no other reasons except such as invalidate 
the opposite of the proposition for which they 
are advanced, can fully satisfy the intellect and 
thus produce certainty. 

Thus when the view that the earth moved, 
was first advanced by Copernicus, the reasons 
given by him were not such as to exclude the 
opposite opinion, namely, that the earth was at 



Requisites for Certitude 29 

rest. It was a theory then ; and it was by reason 
of the weakness of the arguments brought for- 
ward in its support that it was not generally ac- 
cepted as at present, when we are furnished with 
several proofs which shut out altogether the old 
belief as embodied in the Ptolemaic system. 

29. The argument just given may also be 
very briefly presented in a somewhat different 
guise thus : 

In order that I may be certain in any particular 
case, my assent must be infallible. For to say 
that an affirmation is certain and to say that it is 
infallible, comes to the same thing. Now, in- 
fallibility is denned as entire exemption from 
liability to error; hence, assent that is infallible, 
must be traceable to reasons, which cannot under 
any circumstances co-exist with error. 

ARTICLE 3 

Third Requisite for Certitude 
The Infallibility of the Motives for As- 
sent must be Evident 

Summary: Thesis: the infallibility of the motives of 
assent must be evident — Brief explanation 
of the notion of evidence — Proof of the 
thesis — In what sense the mind can be said 
to adhere to what is false without fear of 
error. 

30. But there is still a third condition re- 
quired for perfect certitude. 



30 Certitude 



THESIS 3 • 

In order to possess certitude in the 
strict and highest sense of the word, 
it is not enough for the intellect to 
assent to a statement true in itself and 
based on infallible grounds; these 
grounds must, moreover, manifest 
themselves to the mind as evidently 
infallible, that is, as necessarily con- 
nected with the truth. 

We assert then in this third thesis, that the 
reasons on account of which the mind yields 
certain assent must be evident to it. Although 
the discussion of the subject of evidence con- 
stitutes a special treatise of its own, the require- 
ments of our thesis call for a brief exposition 
of the meaning of evidence as used here. 

Evidence, in general, is anything that renders* 
truth apparent to the intellect. It is either ob- 
jective or subjective. Objective evidence, which 
is evidence properly so called, is nothing else 
than objective truth revealing itself to the mind 
so clearly as to compel assent. As we shall see 
later, whenever an object with the light of evi- 
dence shining upon it, is placed before the think- 
ing agent, the mind must yield to this clear 
manifestation of the truth ; whereas when such 
evidence is wanting, the surrender of the intel- 



Requisites for Certitude 31 

lect by pronouncing judgment on insufficient 
grounds, is due, in part, to the power of the 
will exercising its sway over the cognitive facul- 
ties. This objective evidence is figuratively 
called the light through which truth discloses 
itself to the mind. 

Subjective evidence is the effect produced by 
objective evidence. It may be described as the 
perception of a statement with such clearness 
and distinctness, that all wavering of the intel- 
lect in regard to its certainty vanishes. 

To have perfect certitude, then, the exclusion 
of the opposite of a statement must be evident. 
This in plain English means, that we cannot be 
sure of a statement, unless we clearly see the 
force of the reasons given in proof. 

31. Our assertion may be established in the 
following manner. Certain assent is the perfec- 
tion of the cognitive or knowing faculty. Now 
unshaken adherence of mind to a truth without 
the evident or clear perception of the infalli- 
bility of the grounds in its favor, is assent which 
cannot render to itself an account of its firm- 
ness ; it is firm assent, the firmness of which 
does not proceed from knowledge. For if I do 
not know that the grounds for my unwavering 
adherence to a truth are infallible, that is, neces- 
sarily connected with the truth, I cannot know 
that I am not mistaken. Hence, such assent, 
in so far as it is fixed and unyielding, would not 



3 2 Certitude 

be rational ; it would resemble the blind instinct, 
by which the irrational animals are guided and 
pushed on. Now, it is plain that blind and un- 
founded acquiescence in a statement cannot pos- 
sibly constitute the perfection of a seeing or 
knowing faculty, such as the intellect is. 

Suppose some one brings forward the most 
incontestable arguments to prove to me the geo- 
metrical proposition that the square described 
upon the hypothenuse is equivalent to the sum 
of the squares described upon the other two 
sides. As long as I do not see their force, that 
is, as long as I do not clearly perceive the neces- 
sary connection between the arguments advanced 
and the truth of the proposition in question, I 
cannot give that firm assent, which rests on in- 
sight and is rational. 

32. The same argument might also be pro- 
posed in a slightly different form thus: In 
order that the infallible grounds, which accord- 
ing to our second thesis are required for certi- 
tude, may produce fixity of assent, they must, 
of course, act upon the mind. But to this end, 
they must manifest themselves as infallible. 
For it is only through the knowledge of their 
infallibility, that these grounds appeal to the 
mind and become capable of influencing it in 
such a manner as to compel assent. 

Let us add another argument in proof of our 
thesis. 



Requisites for Certitude 33 

33. An intellectual being by its very nature 
must know its own thoughts by reflection, and, 
hence, in attaining to certitude must become con- 
scious of this certitude. To become conscious 
of this certitude, however, it must clearly see 
that the reasons for admitting the truth exclude 
all error. 

34. A difficulty answered. This seems to 
be the most appropriate occasion to redeem our 
promise (Xo. 9) of showing how it is possible 
for the mind to adhere, without fear of error, 
not only to what is true, but sometimes also to 
what is false. How can this be? Is not this 
an admission that certitude is, as the skeptics 
say, impossible of attainment? For if false and 
genuine certitude resemble each other so closely, 
how can I tell one from the other? How can 
I know that what seems most solid, may not 
after all be only a soap bubble? 

In unriddling this apparent paradox, we must 
distinguish between absence of fear in the will 
and quiet of mind. For although in assent both 
to what is true and to what is false, the will 
may experience no fear that the intellect is 
mistaken, yet the quiet of mind which is the 
characteristic mark of genuine certitude, is never 
complete when one adheres stanchly to an er- 
roneous statement. For quiet of mind (which, 
unlike the absence of the fear of error, resides 
entirely in the intellect), is consequent upon the 



34 Certitude 

presence of evidence, as explained before; and 
it is impossible for the false to be evident; for 
evidence is truth clearly manifesting itself to, 
and forcing its acceptance upon, the mind. 
Now the false — that which is not — cannot mani- 
fest itself clearly as real and true. Such 
manifestation is reserved to reality — to that 
which IS — to the true. Hence we maintain 
that false assent, no matter how persistent and 
firm according to all appearances, is always ac- 
companied by a certain lack of evidence, by a 
certain haziness, by a certain want of lucidity 
or clearness, which warns the mind to halt and 
re-examine its grounds for assent. 



CHAPTER THIRD 

PROPERTIES OF CERTITUDE 

ARTICLE i 

Metaphysical Certitude Absolute Certitude 

Summary: Thesis : metaphysical certitude absolute cer- 
titude — Difference between metaphysical, 
physical and moral certitude on the one 
hand, and absolute and hypothetical on the 
other — Proof of thesis. 

35. After thus analyzing the notion of certi- 
tude, let us now pass on to the consideration of 
some of its properties, a disquisition which will 
often stand us in good stead in our battle against 
false philosophy. 

At the outset of this treatise, we divided certi- 
tude into three orders, namely metaphysical, 
physical and moral, and gave their respective 
definitions. The question now arises, whether 
the name certitude is rightly applied to each of 
these three divisions, or whether it is attributed 
to one alone in the strict sense of the word, and 
to the others in a wider sense. 

We answer that the three assents, namely, 
metaphysical, physical and moral, have all of 

35 



36 Certitude 

them a just title to be called certitude, although 
they differ essentially in the degree of perfec- 
tion, in which they share the common predicate, 
the metaphysical being absolute, and the physical 
and moral being conditional. We shall en- 
deavor to solve the problems involved in this 
statement in the next four theses. 

THESIS 4 

Metaphysical certitude is rightly 
named absolute. 

Before we prove this assertion, take notice of 
an important difference between metaphysical, 
physical and moral certitude on the one hand, 
and absolute and hypothetical on the other. 
Metaphysical, physical and moral certitude have 
regard to the grounds of assent, (v. g. the es- 
sences of things or the laws of nature) as con- 
sidered in themselves; whereas absolute and 
hypothetical certitude view these same grounds 
as unconditioned or conditioned from without. 

36. With these remarks premised, we prove 
the thesis thus: Metaphysical certitude is 
grounded on reasons drawn from the inward 
nature of things, and hence involved in the very 
idea of the truth affirmed. Thus, when I say, 
"The whole is greater than any of its parts," 
the essence of whole and of part, or the ideas 
representing them, afford me all the data for 



Properties of Certitude 37 

my firm assent to the statement. Now (as will 
be shown in Ontology), the essences of things 
are unchangeable and indestructible : whatever 
goes to constitute them, belongs to them with 
absolute necessity, and hence independently of 
any condition possible or thinkable. For, es- 
sence in the strict sense of the word, is that 
without which a thing can neither exist nor be 
conceived; consequently, it is inseparably bound 
up with the object of which it is the essence. 
Since then mental adherence to truth is propor- 
tionate to the grounds which determine it, and 
upon which it rests for its stability, it follows 
that metaphysical assent, as being the result of 
motives which are absolute and unconditioned 
in their nature, is itself absolute and uncondi- 
tioned. 



ARTICLE 2 

[Metaphysical Certitude the Only Absolute 
Certitude 

Summary: Thesis: metaphysical certitude the only ab- 
solute certitude — Ambiguous meaning of 
the expression "absolute and conditional 
assent" — Proof of the thesis. 

37. It still remains for us to show that meta- 
physical certitude is the only absolute certitude; 
and this we shall do in the next thesis. 



38 Certitude 



THESIS 5 

No other assent except that which is 
given to a statement on metaphysical 
grounds possesses absolute firmness. 

For the better understanding of this thesis, it 
might be well to direct attention to another way 
of phrasing the above assertion. We are some- 
times told that assent resting on a metaphysical 
basis is "absolute"; whereas mental adherence 
for physical and moral considerations is condi- 
tional (hypothetical). This manner of stating 
the case is somewhat ambiguous. For when we 
say that our assent is absolute or conditional, our 
meaning may either be that it is absolutely or 
conditionally given, or that its firmness and un- 
changeableness is absolute or conditional. We 
do not intend to convey the former idea. For, 
assent is always absolutely given, since assent 
conditionally yielded would be assent withheld 
until the fulfilment of some condition is realized, 
and therefore would not be actual assent at all. 
Hence the words "absolute" and "conditional" 
have reference to the "firmness" of the mental 
concurrence in the truth affirmed. 

Let us explain this by an analogous instance. 
It would not seem inappropriate to call matri- 
mony an absolute, and betrothal a conditioned 
engagement; not in the sense that in the one 



Properties of Certitude 39 

case consent is positively given, and in the other, 
it is not; — for both matrimony and betrothal 
suppose an actual, present agreement; — but in 
this sense that the one contract is absolutely un- 
alterable, whereas the other is annullable under 
certain conditions. 

38. Our thesis is really nothing else than an 
extension of the foregoing one. For, as we 
said there, assent possessing absolute firmness 
calls for motives of the same character, that is, 
motives subject to no implied condition; since 
assent and its motives stand to each other in 
the relation of effect and cause, and the effect 
cannot surpass the cause in perfection — in the 
present case, in firmness. Now there are no 
other motives which are altogether unconditional 
except those styled metaphysical. For the 
physical laws and the moral instincts are both 
dependent on certain contingencies, the former 
on possible Divine interference, and the latter, 
on the arbitrary use of man's free will. Hence, 
it follows that physical and moral certitude — if 
certitude at all, a question to be settled soon — 
are at best conditional; and consequently, meta- 
physical certitude alone is absolute. 

39. We might note here in passing, what we 
shall explain explicitly further on in proving the 
genuineness of physical and moral certitude, that 
assent based on metaphysical grounds is certi- 
tude by excellence. For there can be nothing 



40 Certitude 

more excellent than the absolute and the uncon- 
ditioned ; and metaphysical certitude is such in 
its own sphere. In fact, metaphysical truths 
are the centre, round which all our cognition 
revolves, they are the fulcrum, on which all our 
knowledge rests, they are the light within the 
mind, without which all would be darkness and 
chaos. 

ARTICLE 3 

Physical and Moral Certitude, though 
Hypothetical, still True Certitude 

Summary: Thesis: physical and moral certitude, 
though hypothetical, still true certitude — 
The force of hypothetical propositions — 
First argument of the thesis — Answer to 
the objection that no propositions can be 
certain unless the fear of error and the 
danger of a mistake is absolutely excluded 
— Second argument of the thesis — Answer 
to the objection that unless the possibility 
of a miracle is altogether excluded, assent 
is merely probable — How physical and 
moral certitude can become absolute — 
Chief objection to our doctrine unsound 
even from standpoint of Dialectics — Con- 
firmation of our view by the verdict of 
common sense — Meaning of common sense 
here — Signs by which to recognize judg- 
ments of common sense— An objection an- 
swered. 

40. We now leave the region of metaphysi- 
cal certitude with these few remarks, and pass 



Properties of Certitude 41 

on to a subject which is not so plain and has 
given rise to different views even amongst men 
who sincerely seek the truth and embrace it, 
as soon as it clearly manifests itself. It regards 
the nature of physical and moral certitude. Let 
us express our doctrine on this controverted 
point thus : 

THESIS 6 

Intellectual assent, based on the 
physical laws and the moral instincts 
of men, is truly and genuinely cer- 
tain,, although, being conditioned, it 
is imperfect as compared with meta- 
physical. 

41. This then, in brief, is the debated ques- 
tion which we are about to discuss ; and as it 
would seem that much of the difficulty experi- 
enced in understanding the views of either side, 
is due to a loose use of certain terms, let us first 
of all clearly and distinctly mark out the bound- 
aries of those most liable to breed confusion. 

One of the chief sources of vagueness in this 
matter arises from the peculiar kind of certainty 
possessed by hypothetical (conditional) propo- 
sitions. 

To settle this question with precision, we must 
bear in mind that a hypothetical proposition 
consists of two parts, namely the antecedent or 



42 Certitude 

condition, and the consequent or conditioned 
proposition. What we properly assert in a 
hypothetical proposition, is the relation between 
the antecedent and the consequent. Thus, when 
I say, "If there is a breeze, the leaves of the 
trees rustle," I do not assert either that there is 
a breeze, or that the leaves rustle; all I want 
to point out, is the relation between the two 
parts of the hypothetical sentence. This con- 
nection may be, and often is absolutely certain. 
But it not unfrequently happens, that the con- 
sequent of a conditional sentence has a certain 
measure of certainty of its own, to which I may 
direct my attention. Certainty, in this case, is 
necessarily conditioned, that is, dependent on a 
certain contingency; yet it is certainty for all 
that, as we shall see hereafter. Let us illus- 
trate our meaning by an example. Suppose a 
young man should say to you: "I shall win 
the prize in the contest I am about to enter, if 
the judges are not biased by prejudice." In 
this proposition, we may regard the relation 
between the antecedent and the consequent; or, 
we can, if we so choose, restrict ourselves to 
the consideration of the consequent, taken by 
itself, viz., "I shall win the prize in the contest," 
together with the grounds in its support, and 
see what degree of certainty, if any, it possesses. 
Perhaps the contestant judges so, because he 
knows his own powers and the weakness of his 



Properties of Certitude 43 

opponent ; and because he has come off victori- 
ous under less favorable circumstances. 

By reason of this double character of a hypo- 
thetical proposition then, we likewise meet with 
a twofold assent, one relating to the connection 
between the antecedent and the consequent, and 
the other regarding the conditioned consequent 
on its own merits. We must not lose sight of 
the above distinction in our later researches ; for 
the proper understanding of our thesis hinges 
to a large extent upon it. When we say then, 
that assent based on physical and moral grounds 
is conditioned and imperfect, yet none the less 
certain — we speak of the conditioned proposi- 
tion taken by itself and valued at its own worth, 
and not of the relation between antecedent and 
consequent. We might perhaps make this still 
plainer by choosing two concrete cases, the one 
founded on a physical law, and the other, on one 
of the moral instincts. 

When the king in Schiller's ballad, "The 
Diver," said to the knights and squires standing 
about him : 

"Is amongst ye a knight or squire so bold, 
As to plunge into this abyss? 
I cast in the vortex a goblet of gold, 
The dark waves already surge around it and hiss;" 

he knew, of course, that the goblet of gold would 
surely sink. It is the certitude in regard to this 
4 



44 Certitude 

statement, 'The goblet of gold will surely sink/' 
conditioned by the possibility of Divine inter- 
ference, with which we are concerned now. 
But we have nothing to do here, at least directly, 
with the connection which exists between the 
two propositions, "The goblet of gold will sink" 
and "God will not interfere with the laws of 
nature in this case." 

Now let us add an example drawn from the 
moral order. 

Recall the return of the prodigal son to the 
home of his childhood, how kindly his old fa- 
ther received the young scapegrace in spite of 
his ungrateful behavior; how he fell upon the 
neck of his boy and kissed him, and then for 
joy ordered the fatted calf to be killed, even at 
the risk of wounding the feelings of his other 
son who had never wavered in his fidelity. Any 
one witnessing that scene would have cried out: 
"How that father loves his son I" Now it is this 
assertion as regarded in itself, which is the ob- 
ject of intellectual adherence. We might add 
this condition, "unless he acts a part and 
shamefully plays the hypocrite." But we are 
not now investigating the relation between, 
"This father loves his son," and "He is not act- 
ing a part." 

We must make still another remark, in order 
to show exactly, just how much we affirm in 
this thesis. It is this — the conditioned member 



Properties of Certitude 45 

of a hypothetical sentence may be absolutely 
affirmed, provided the condition to which it is 
conceived to be subject, has been verified. In 
this case, the consequent of the conditional 
proposition may become the conclusion of a sort 
of hypothetical syllogism, somewhat in this man- 
ner: "The goblet of gold flung into the sea, 
will sink unless God works a miracle. Now, I 
know that he will not work a miracle in this 
instance. Therefore I am absolutely certain, 
that the goblet of gold will sink." Whatever may 
be said of the propriety of calling this method 
of setting forth the premises and drawing the 
conclusion, a legitimate syllogism (of which 
more elsewhere), let it be borne in mind, that 
we do not at present suppose the condition to 
have been realized; yet we nevertheless main- 
tain, that assent given on physical and moral 
grounds is truly certain. 

42. We take this attitude in opposition to 
some philosophers who hold that unless the con- 
dition is known to be fulfilled, the mental ad- 
herence can never rise above the level of mere 
probability. We beg to differ from them in this 
particular, and, as we think, for good reasons. 
Let the proofs we are about to give speak for 
themselves. 

43. First argument based on the nature of 
certitude. It has been stated before (thesis 1) 
that certain assent is assent necessarily linked 



46 Certitude 

to truth. We also showed there that assent is 
such whenever the statement adhered to, rests 
on grounds which exclude the possibility of the 
opposite, or, in other words, are necessarily con- 
nected with the truth. 

Now the physical laws and the moral instincts 
are necessarily connected with the truth of the 
statements made on account of them, because 
these laws and instincts are themselves neces- 
sary, i. e. necessarily productive of their re- 
spective effects. No doubt, this necessity is 
conditioned, yet it is necessity none the less, as 
we shall show presently. Hence, assent resting 
on the laws and instincts in question, must like- 
wise be necessary, that is, necessarily connected 
with the truth, and so far forth certain. 

The radical reason implied in the above argu- 
mentation is, that the physical laws and moral 
instincts render the assertion which they motive, 
evident; and evidence always begets certitude. 

It now remains to show that the physical laws 
and the inborn propensities grafted by the Cre- 
ator on our rational constitution are forces 
which coerce and necessitate in a true sense of 
the word. 

And first, that such is the case, is acknowl- 
edged by the voice of mankind. For men often 
speak of the laws of nature as "inexorable," 
"relentless," and the like, thus implicitly avow- 
ing their constraining power, as in the following 



Properties of Certitude 47 

proverb; "Death is deaf and hears no denial." 
When a certain poet says : 

"Consumption has no pity 
For blue eyes and golden hair," 

he expresses the same truth after his own ideal 
fashion. The well-known adage, "The mills of 
the gods grind slow, but grind exceeding fine," 
is but another way of stating that Nature ob- 
tains certain ends unfailingly through her laws. 

Many of our old sayings, which are in the 
mouth of everybody and are often nothing else 
than the concrete embodiment of certain moral 
instincts, frequently take a categorical and ab- 
solute form ; and this shows that they are re- 
garded by men as resting on necessary and 
unchangeable principles, as, "Deserve success, 
and you shall have it" ; "Evil communications 
corrupt good manners"; "Pride shall have a 
fall" ; and a host of others. 

The philosophical reason for this necessity is 
given in the Treatise on "Induction," where it is 
shown that both the physical laws and the moral 
instincts have their ultimate root in the inner 
nature of the agents from which they proceed. 

44. It will be seen from the above that for a 
statement to be really certain, the possibility of 
the opposite need not be excluded absolutely; 
all that is required is, that the motives of assent 
possess some sort of real necessity. In fact, 



48 Certitude 

were it otherwise, almost all the statements 
founded upon the regularity of the physical 
forces (to say nothing of those based on moral 
grounds), would thereby sink to the level of 
mere probabilities ; since it is very difficult to 
tell whether there is not some hidden reason 
locked up in the bosom of God whose "judg- 
ments are incomprehensible and whose ways are 
unsearchable," why it should please him to 
change the established order of things in any 
particular case. 

45. An objection raised. But some one 
might ask, is not this assertion (namely, that a 
proposition may be certain, and yet not exclude 
the contradictory absolutely) opposed to the 
very definition of certitude, which requires that 
all fear of error be barred out and that all 
danger of going astray be removed? 

We answer to this, that our doctrine is not 
at variance with the definition of certitude ; for 
when we assert that certitude shuts out all doubt 
and obviates all danger of a mistake, we have 
reference to well-founded, prudent, rational 
doubts, and to the danger of error truly such; 
and not to unfounded, foolish, irrational mis- 
givings, and merely fantastic, imaginary perils. 
These latter are to be scouted and disregarded, 
and hence cannot destroy our firm adherence to 
truth. 

As regards the danger of error in particular, 



Properties of Certitude 49 

which may need some further explanation, re- 
member that danger signifies exposure to immi- 
nent or threatening evil; and I think, it will be 
conceded by all that no risk is run, no chances 
are taken, if in reliance on the physical laws and 
moral instincts, I rest assured, for instance, that 
the solid oaken boards of my room, on which I 
am standing, will not be suddenly turned into 
thin air, but will continue to support me ; or that 
a gay young student, who whilst boating with 
some of his friends has fallen overboard, will 
not refuse to grasp the oar held out to him. 

46. Second argument based on the distinc- 
tion between certain and probable assent. 
Assent of whatever kind, is either certain or 
probable. For the other mental states besides 
certitude and opinion (or probable assent) 
are ignorance, suspicion and doubt, none of 
which can lay claim to the name of intel- 
lectual assent. Hence, if we can prove that the 
mental adherence given on the strength of the 
physical laws and the moral instincts is not 
probable, it follows that it is certain; and this 
we can do. For assent which is merely prob- 
able is not necessarily true, since it is yielded 
on debatable and undecisive grounds, on grounds 
which imply a "may," but not a "must," and 
which therefore involve no necessity of any sort. 
Suppose that you see your friend reclining very 
composedly on his couch with his eyes closed, 



50 Certitude 

and that you form the judgment, "He is asleep": 
your reasons for arriving at this inference, as is 
obvious, carry no necessity with them; for they 
are of such a character, that the statement, "He 
is not asleep," is quite compatible with them; 
that is to say, they are merely probable. 

But quite the contrary happens, when there is 
question of an enunciation based on the physical 
laws and the moral instincts of men. Then we 
are confronted not with a mere "may," but with 
a "must." We have no longer to do with vari- 
able and shifting grounds, but with grounds of 
an entirely fixed and peremptory description. 
If I see a quarter of mutton suspended on a 
spit over a blazing fire, I know that the meat will 
become roasted. My assent is unhesitating and 
unwavering. 

Since then the motives of mental adherence 
drawn from the physical laws and the moral 
instincts, are of an essentially different nature 
from those brought forward for a mere proba- 
bility, we infer that assent on account of these 
laws and instincts cannot be probable, and hence 
must be certain ; for, as we stated above, there 
is no middle state between certain and probable 
assent. 

47. A difficulty met. But here we are con- 
fronted with a difficulty. We said in our last 
proof, that the motive of assent for a physical 
fact differs essentially from a mere probability. 



Properties of Certitude 51 

Such, however, our opponents argue, does not 
seem to be the case. For where the possibility 
of a miracle is not absolutely excluded — as we 
hold, it is not in mere physical certitude — the 
law of nature is thereby brought down to the 
level of a mere probable ground of assent, as 
happened, for instance, when our Blessed Lord 
had arrived at Bethania to summon Lazarus 
from the tomb. (N. B. We confine ourselves 
to the consideration of the physical laws for the 
sake of simplicity; but what holds true of them, 
applies mutatis mutandis to the moral instincts 
as well.) 

We answer, in the first place, that the above 
objection rests on a false assumption. For it 
is taken for granted that the motive of assent 
for physical certitude is twofold, namely the 
law as well as the assurance that there will be 
no exception to its due operation. Now, this is 
a mistake. The motive for physical certitude is 
one, namely the necessity of the law. This al- 
ways remains the same, even though there be 
some likelihood of nature swerving from its 
ordinary course in a particular instance. True, 
in order to have genuine physical certitude, we 
must be sure that no positive reasons of any 
sort exist for conjecturing a departure from the 
customary workings of the natural forces; in 
other words, that no indication whatever of 
probable Divine intervention appears. But such 



52 Certitude 

knowledge is required, not as a motive of assent, 
but merely as an indispensable condition for us 
to perceive that the law — the true motive of as- 
sent — is applicable in a given case. The ab- 
sence of every sign that God will exercise his 
right as Sovereign Lord of nature, does not 
move the mind to affirm the statement under 
consideration; it merely renders it possible for 
the physical laws duly to influence the intellect. 
In a similar manner, it is the flame of the match 
which lights the wick; yet, in order that it may 
do so, I must apply it: the immediate contact 
between the flame and the wick is merely re- 
quired as a condition for the ignition to take 
place. 

Bear in mind, however, we must suppose 
that the conditions for the effectiveness of the 
physical laws and the moral instincts — namely 
Divine non-interference and the due concurrence 
of the will of man — will be realized unless some 
reason to the contrary can be shown. For, as 
regards the physical laws, an infinitely wise Be- 
ing, such as God is, never suspends the estab- 
lished order of things except for considerations 
of a most weighty character, and therefore ex- 
tremely seldom. Hence, the fulfilment of the 
conditions in this case is guaranteed by Infinite 
Wisdom itself. And as to those propensities, 
which are called "leges morales" in Latin philo- 
sophical works, it must be remembered that they 



Properties of Certitude 53 

have been implanted in man's breast by a loving 
Providence for the essential welfare of the 
noblest portion of visible creation, namely, ra- 
tional beings. They are the safeguards of per- 
sonal happiness and the secure defence of the 
stability of one of God's grandest works, human 
society. Consequently, they too possess such 
stability and fixity, that unless there are positive 
grounds for suspecting unnatural conduct, they 
must be regarded as sure to produce their in- 
tended effect. But we readily admit, as a legiti- 
mate inference from the principles laid down 
by us, that in the case of physical and moral 
certitude a mistake is absolutely possible; for 
were it not so, then both the one and the other 
would thereby become metaphysical certitude. 
But we refuse to grant, that the mere absolute 
possibility of a statement being erroneous pre- 
vents its being certain. 

To avoid misapprehension, let us add that 
when we say, we may be mistaken in matters 
physical and moral, the word mistaken must be 
understood in a somewhat modified sense. For 
in order to be mistaken according to the full 
import of the word, the opposite of what we 
judged would take place must, in no way, be 
foreseen and allowed. This, however, cannot 
be claimed here; since we foresee and hence, 
after a fashion, allow the possibility of an ex- 
ception to the physical laws and moral instincts. 



54 Certitude 

Consequently, no mistake properly so called can 
be laid to our charge, if an assertion of ours, 
made on the strength of the physical laws and 
moral instincts, turns out false, since it was 
conditioned and not absolute. It would perhaps 
be more appropriate to say that the unexpected 
happened or the exception to the rule came true 
for once: just as a man who belongs to a party 
which he thought would win in a political cam- 
paign, will tell you that he was on the wrong 
side rather than that he was mistaken; for he, 
too, recognized and therefore admitted the pos- 
sibility, and (in this case) also the probability 
of losing in the contest. This is sometimes ex- 
pressed technically by saying, that such error 
is merely material and not formal. 

48. How physical and moral certitude can 
become absolute. We hold then that condi- 
tional assent, as above described, is truly cer- 
tain; yet, on the other hand, we readily admit 
that both physical and moral certitude can be- 
come absolute. For though intellectual adher- 
ence to a proposition may not be absolutely firm 
in itself, it may be rendered so by linking it to a 
metaphysical principle ; and this is what is called 
reducing physical and moral certitude to meta- 
physical. Thus, I am metaphysically (or abso- 
lutely) certain that the course of nature will be 
very rarely interfered with by the Almighty. 
True, God, considering his absolute power alone, 



Properties of Certitude 55 

can change it at any moment; yet knowing that 
he is both wise and holy, I have perfect assur- 
ance that he will not do so except for very mo- 
mentous reasons, and therefore very seldom. I 
am also metaphysically certain that my friend, 
with whom I have associated for years on fa- 
miliar terms exists and has the general appear- 
ance, I think he has. For it is utterly ridiculous 
to suppose that God would all this time conjure 
up a phantom before me and permit me to take 
it for a reality. I am likewise absolutely cer- 
tain, that Christ the Lord has graced this earth 
of ours with his presence, that Pius X is now 
(1910) Sovereign Pontiff and William Taft 
President of the United States, that Rome ex- 
ists, that Julius Caesar was a famous Roman 
general and statesman, etc. For if these and 
similar statements are false, we would have to 
admit that there could be an effect without a 
proportionate cause. 

49. Chief objection against our view, un- 
sound even from the standpoint of Dialectics. 
It might not be out of place here, to give the 
chief objection of our opponents in another 
form, under which it is sometimes proposed, 
and show that even from a purely dialectical 
standpoint, it is faulty ; and this all the more so, 
as we have alluded to this manner of argumenta- 
tion before (No. 41) and cast doubt on its legiti- 
macy. 



56 Certitude 

Let us for the sake of clearness present their 
counter-proof under the guise of a definite syllo- 
gism thus: 

This old man will die soon unless God sus- 
pends the usual course of nature. Now God 
will not do so. Therefore he will die soon. 

But, say our antagonists, the minor of this; 
syllogism, being, as a rule, only probable, the 
conclusion likewise will possess no more than 
probability, since, as one of the rules of the 
syllogism has it, the conclusion always follows 
the character of the weaker premise. Hence it 
would seem that physical assent is never certain, 
unless I am absolutely sure that God will not 
change the regular course of events. 

In answer we reply, in the first place, that our 
objectors suppose the minor of the above argu- 
mentation, viz. "God will not suspend the usual 
course of nature," to be one of the grounds of 
assent to the conclusion, "This old man will die 
soon"; which is erroneous. As we have, how- 
ever, developed this point thoroughly before, we 
shall waive any further discussion of the diffi- 
culty regarded from this view-point. 

But this is not the only weakness of the fore- 
going captious fallacy. There is a flaw in the 
very structure of the syllogism, since for a syllo- 
gism to be such in the true sense of the word, 
the minor must set forth something, not already 



Properties of* Certitude 57 

expressed in the major. This, however, is not 
so in the present case. 

To perceive this the more clearly, let us re- 
state the major and the minor more fully with 
all that they imply, and our contention, I think, 
will then be readily granted. 

Our major read thus : "This old man will die 
soon, unless God suspends the usual course of 
nature." The subject, "This old man," must, of 
course, be taken in the concrete, such as it actu- 
ally is. Suppose then, that our invalid is a 
nonagenarian, worn out with disease and old 
age, altogether helpless and useless, weary of 
life and very anxious to be dissolved. Hence 
our syllogism fully drawn out will run thus: 

This old man, over ninety years of age, wasted 
by disease and enfeebled by the weight of years, 
a burden to himself and others, and longing to 
depart this life, will die in the near future, un- 
less God suspends one or more of the laws of 
nature. Now God will not do so, just because 
the old man is so wasted and useless, in a word, 
because his course is run. Therefore he will 
die soon. 

A mere inspection of the premises thus spread 
out, shows that the minor is already fully ex- 
pressed in the major. The above argumentation 
has no more claim to the name of a syllogism 
in the strict sense of the word than the follow- 



58 Certitude 

ing: "Every pigeon is an animal. Every ani- 
mal is a living being. Therefore, every pigeon 
is a living being." 

50. We have then demonstrated to convic- 
tion that intellectual assent based on the physical 
laws and the moral instincts, constitutes true 
certitude. In our thesis we added a qualifying 
clause to this statement, namely that physical and 
moral certitude are conditioned, and hence im- 
perfect as compared with metaphysical. This 
follows so evidently from what goes before, and 
is again involved in what is about to follow, 
that there is no need of saying any more about 
this phase of our subject. 

51. Let us now still further strengthen our 
position by an appeal to common sense. If the 
proof of the following thesis should not be alto- 
gether satisfactory, it will at least confirm our 
contention and put its reasonableness in a clearer 
light. 

THESIS 7 

The verdict of common sense con- 
firms the conclusion arrived at, that 
assent based on physical and moral 
motives is truly and genuinely cer- 
tain. 

But before proceeding to our argument, let 
us make a few general remarks on the force of 



Properties of Certitude 59 

a demonstration which rests upon the testimony 
of "Common Sense." 

52. Meaning of "Common Sense." What 
is here meant by common sense? In ordinary 
parlance, common sense is the same as sound 
practical judgment. But in philosophy, we may 
define it with Webster as "that power of the 
mind which by a kind of instinct or short proc- 
ess of reasoning perceives truth, the relation of 
things, cause and effect, etc." Common sense, 
then, in this connection is a certain ease or readi- 
ness wrought into the very fabric of our minds 
to judge correctly regarding matters closely con- 
nected with man's intellectual, moral and social 
welfare. The name sense is given to this super- 
sensible faculty by analogy, because, like the 
senses in general, it perceives its object immedi- 
ately (at least in very many cases), and like 
sight in particular, it acts (for the most part) 
by intuition. Common sense is a kind of intel- 
lectual insight. 

Here are a few pronouncements which have 
their source in this common sense of mankind: 
"Our mental faculties are given us for the at- 
tainment of truth"; "What is evident is cer- 
tain" ; "To doubt about everything, is impossible 
and absurd" ; "The external universe is not a 
mere illusion, but exists independently of our 
thoughts"; "An occurrence testified to by every- 
body, or at least by very many — for example, 



60 Certitude 

the invasion of Russia by Napoleon Bonaparte- 
has certainly taken place." 

As will be seen, we have restricted ourselves 
in the choice of examples to such, as have some 
immediate bearing on Logic. 

Nor is it difficult to account for the existence 
of this natural endowment, called "Common 
Sense." For it stands to reason that the Author 
of nature should have laid such tendencies in 
man's intellectual make-up, as would enable him 
to recognize, as it were, spontaneously, unbidden 
and without effort, those things, the knowledge 
of which is essentially bound up with his happi- 
ness. For, "natura non deficit in necessariis," 
nature never fails in what is necessary. 

Hence God has given us, what might be called 
an intellectual instinct, inclining and urging our 
minds to accept certain truths with readiness 
and full assurance. 

But it must not be imagined that these truths 
are thus received through a "blind" instinct. 
No, they are each and all of them illumined by 
their own evidence, since the reasons for their 
admission, though not perhaps understood scien- 
tifically, yet present themselves to the mind with 
sufficient clearness for rational assent. 

If then a judgment is prompted by this com- 
mon sense, we are sure that it is true. The only 
hindrance which obstructs our path in this mat- 
ter at times, is the difficulty of knowing whether 



Properties of Certitude 61 

any given conviction is really a dictate of com- 
mon sense. However, there are certain signs, 
which will serve us as safe guides to discern the 
genuine from the spurious in testing those be- 
liefs of ours which seem to spring from this 
source of common sense. 

If a judgment really proceeds from an inborn 
tendency of the human mind, it must be acknowl- 
edged as certain by practically everybody; there 
may be exceptions to this universality; for it is 
possible to stifle even the voice of nature. 

Further, enunciations which are, so to speak, 
the birth-right of mankind, must have been re- 
ceived as true at all times. There can have been 
no epoch in the history of the race when their 
compelling and binding force was not recog- 
nized. 

True — as in the previous case — the clearness 
of some of these truths has been dimmed at cer- 
tain periods by the unaccountable and eccentric 
twists of thought on the part of a few singu- 
larly constituted intellects ; yet always with the 
result, that these convictions have not only 
emerged victorious from the clash of opinions, 
but have taken still firmer hold on all rational 
minds, thus gaining strength even through oppo- 
sition. 

Besides these marks of common sense truths, 
namely their universality and continuity, which 
regard the entire race, there are others of a more 



62 Certitude 

personal character, all of them deducible from 
the fact that these beliefs are supposed to spring 
from nature, and therefore to be natural to 
men. 

Now what is natural to us (that is, what pro- 
ceeds spontaneously from our common nature), 
is born with us, and puts forth its activity, as 
soon as it is sufficiently developed. Hence these 
truths of common sense must have been in our 
possession, ever since we can remember ; they 
must be so familiar to us, that we cannot even 
recall how we acquired them. 

Again, what is natural to us, is an object of 
our special affection and devotion ; we cling to it 
most tenaciously. If then a conviction rests on 
an inborn tendency of our nature, we must hold 
it so dear that we will not surrender it at any 
cost. 

Further, what is truly natural to a person, 
cannot be set aside or disregarded by him with- 
out a sense of shame and guilt. Hence one 
would expect that even a doubt about a truth of 
common sense seriously entertained, would be 
regarded by men as tantamount to a denial of 
reason and a stultification of the intellect. 

Lastly, what is natural to us, bears the closest 
scrutiny : the more critically it is looked into, the 
more highly it will commend itself. If then there 
are persuasions which are the offspring of na- 
ture, it would seem, that the more accurately and 



Properties of Certitude 63 

quietly they are examined, the more their force 
and reasonableness should appear. 

These are some of the signs characteristic of 
the truths of Common Sense. Where they and 
similar ones are found, there, we may be sure, 
we have to deal with convictions that have their 
source in an inbred tendency of our intellect. 

True, many objections have been urged against 
the existence of this criterion of Common Sense ; 
as the once all but universal belief in the influ- 
ence of the stars on the birth of men; or the 
widely diffused opinion that the earth was flat, 
that the sun moved, and that men could not live 
at the antipodes. But it might be shown easily 
enough, that these and similar erroneous no- 
tions, though once almost unanimously accepted, 
do not bear all the requisite hall-marks of judg- 
ments originating in an innate impulse of nature. 

As, however, we are not now explaining this 
subject of "Common Sense" professedly, we shall 
postpone its fuller treatment to another place. 

Let us now apply the above general remarks 
to the case in hand. We say then that common 
sense confirms what we have endeavored to 
prove, namely that assent on physical and moral 
grounds is true and genuine certitude. 

53. For, in the first place, who will dare to 
question that the physical laws and moral instincts 
have from time immemorial been thought to pos- 
sess a certain degree of real necessity; and that 



64 Certitude 

not by a few persons, but by everybody. The 
very names lazv and instinct bear witness to this. 
Finally, if we turn to ourselves, we find that we 
accept, without hesitation, any assertion resting 
on the necessity inherent in these laws and in- 
stincts. We know that we have done so ever 
since we can remember, and that we do so now 
with even greater energy and force of intellect. 
Nor can it be said that we assent inconsiderately 
and rashly. For we are aware of the irresistible 
force of these truths, even when thinking most 
calmly and dispassionately : nay, we often feel 
constrained to give in to them against our very 
inclinations. So true is this, that terms and 
phrases have been borrowed from the realm of 
physical certitude to express the strength of 
metaphysical conclusions. Thus, when we say 
that some statement of ours is palpable or tangi- 
ble, our meaning is, that it is as evident and 
certain as the existence of things which can be 
touched with the hands. We speak of ocular 
proof in the same sense; we say that something 
is as clear as day-light. In fact, the word evi- 
dence itself is derived from the Latin videre, to 
see. We regard an appeal to the senses as the 
strongest weapon of silencing a headstrong op- 
ponent. We think that we can put a stop to a 
quarrel at once by telling a disputant : "Why, I 
have seen it with my own eyes ; I have heard it 
with these ears; I have touched it with my own 



Properties of Certitude 65 

hands." It was thus that Christ overcame the 
incredulity of his disciple Thomas, when he said 
to him: "Put in thy finger hither, and see my 
hands ; and bring hither thy hand, and put it 
into my side ; and be not faithless, but believing." 

This striking readiness and proneness of the 
human mind, peculiar to all men and dating back 
to the very cradle of rational existence, to yield 
assent to judgments resting on physical and 
moral grounds, shows conclusively that the Au- 
thor of nature has, so to speak, attuned our in- 
tellects to accept them without the least hesita- 
tion, and that therefore they must be true. For 
the God of Truth himself is the voucher for 
tnem. 

There is hardly any need of illustrating our 
teaching as far as the physical laws are con- 
cerned. The case is too plain. You feel per- 
fectly sure that if you take up a red-hot coal, it 
will burn you, or that if a heavy shower pours 
down on the parched fields in summer, they will 
absorb the moisture and become drenched with 
rain. Who doubts it? 

But it may be useful to add an instance or two 
to show the firmness and strength of convictions 
founded^ on the moral instincts (the "leges 
morales" of the Scholastics). 

Take the case of a father and mother who are 
well known for the deep interest which they have 
always taken in the welfare of their children. 



66 Certitude 

Suppose that one of their sons becomes seriously 
ill. Is not everybody acquainted with them per- 
fectly sure that they will at once call in a physi- 
cian and do all in their power to save their 
child ? And why ? because we are all well aware 
that the love of father and mother for their off- 
spring is a sacred instinct implanted in nature. 

Now follow the father to the physician and 
hear him plead in a voice choked with emotion : 
"Dear Sir, please, do come at once to my house ; 
my son is very sick." Could you deem it possi- 
ble for the physician to entertain the slightest 
doubt as to the truthfulness of the afflicted fa- 
ther and to say to himself: "That man is 
lying." No! For both the love of truth and 
love of honor, two other heaven-born instincts 
of human nature, tell him that there is no decep- 
tion here ; that it would be an insult to that good 
man to harbor so much as a breath of suspicion. 
To confirm this by a concrete example, recall the 
submissive request made by the woman of 
Canaan to Christ to heal her poor daughter, who 
was grievously troubled by the devil, and her 
insistence and importunity even after the humili- 
ating and seemingly stinging rebuff of the great 
Wonder-worker. What more natural than such 
a request! For, love for her child, no matter 
how wretched that child may be, stirs in every 
mother's heart. 

But are there not parents who grossly neglect 



Properties of Certitude 67 

their children, expose them to danger and prove 
the cause of their ruin? Alas, it is but too true. 
This, however, argues nothing against our posi- 
tion. For we do not deny that the tendencies 
and promptings of our rational nature are some- 
times deadened and even uprooted by the un- 
natural lives of certain individuals. But when- 
ever this happens, there are always indications 
showing that in these rare cases the moral in- 
stincts of nature have been so blunted as to be 
unreliable. 

For just as, in order to be certain in matters 
physical, there must not be apparent any reason 
pointing to divine interference, so also, to have 
moral certitude, there should be no reasonable 
misgivings that the natural propensities prompt- 
ing conduct have been impaired or crushed out 
in any particular case, and therefore cannot as- 
sert themselves. 

Take another example: Here are two men 
who have loved each other ever since they were 
boys together. They have always respected and 
esteemed one another; for their friendship is 
based on mutual appreciation both of heart and 
mind. They rejoiced with one another when 
fortune smiled, and they sorrowed with each 
other in times of trial. Their conduct attests 
all this. Suppose now that one of them is cast 
into prison on a false charge and that he can 
be rescued by his friend clearing him in court. 



68 Certitude 

Who would hesitate even for a moment as to 
what his friend's course of action will be? For 
the love of friends is an instinct planted deep in 
man's nature, and can be relied upon even in 
times of dire need. 

But what about St. Peter? Did he not deny 
his Master whom he loved so much? Judging 
of this apparent counter-proof of our doctrine 
on merely natural grounds and with all the rev- 
erence due to the Prince of the Apostles, we 
would say that his denial does not refute our 
view in this matter of certitude. 

For, in the first place, moral certitude is not 
absolute, and hence there may be rare excep- 
tions to the rule. Again, in order to have true 
moral certitude, there must be no indications sug- 
gesting that the natural promptings upon which 
we rely in a particular case will be obstructed or 
repressed. Were there none such in the present 
case? Christ, of course, foresaw Peter's fall; 
for he was the omniscient God, and hence his 
foreknowledge belongs to another, a higher or- 
der. But could not others, familiar with the im- 
pulsiveness of Peter, well-meaning and honest 
though he was, have surmised the probability of 
his defection under very trying circumstances? 
It would seem that they could. 

Let us consider yet another of these tendencies 
inborn in man, and in this instance affecting 
more directly his intellectual life, namely the 



Properties of Certitude 69 

desire to learn and find out the unknown. This 
eagerness for knowledge is generally called curi- 
osity or inquisitiveness. Seneca describes this 
tendency in man very tersely when he says: 
"Natura curiosum nobis ingenium dedit." 

We are all perfectly sure that men will be 
swayed by this propensity, at least, whenever 
there is question of something which interests 
them very much, and is of great importance to 
them. Thus, who entertains the least doubt but 
that the farmer will go out frequently into his 
orchard and fields to ascertain with his own eyes 
what the prospects for a fruitful year are? Or 
who ever knew a merchant that did not keep 
himself informed in regard to the state of the 
market ? 

It is related that Francis Borgia, the Duke of 
Gandia, was very fond of hawking, yet he would 
often close his eyes, just when the falcon was 
about to pounce upon its prey. Here our theory 
in regard to the compelling force of the human 
instincts does not seem to hold. Yet, it does. 
For what Francis denied himself, was not a mat- 
ter of any importance to himself or to others. 
Moreover, any one who knew the sterling, rug- 
ged virtue of the man, would not be surprised 
at this proof of self-control. 

54. An objection answered. But, it is 
urged, you concede there are philosophers who 
will not allow statements enunciating facts of 



yo Certitude 

the physical and moral order to be genuinely cer- 
tain, as long as the possibility of an exception 
is not absolutely excluded ; consequently, you 
have no right to invoke the testimony of common 
sense in your favor. 

To this we answer that our argument is not 
based on what some philosophers may have elab- 
orated as philosophers, but on the plain utter- 
ance of the voice of nature. As regards this 
latter, these philosophers are at one with us ; and 
as for their speculative opinion, they seem to be 
mistaken. For their attitude in this question 
arises from an arbitrary definition of certitude, 
as a condition of mind excluding absolutely the 
opposite of the judgment assented to. This is 
precisely what we challenge: they will find it 
hard to establish their definition without assum- 
ing the very point to be proved. 

ARTICLE 4 
Essential Grades of Certitude 

Section i 

Metaphysical Certitude Greater than 
Physical or Moral ; and Physical Greater 
than Moral 

Summary: Thesis and its proof. 

55. There is still another question to be set- 
tled, which is very closely connected with the 



Properties of Certitude Ji 

previous discussion and may, in fact, be re- 
garded as a corollary from it; namely the ques- 
tion touching the specific distinction of the three 
kinds of certitude. Are metaphysical, physical 
and moral certitude three different species of in- 
tellectual assent or not? We speak here of 
subjective certitude primarily, since it alone has 
given rise to divergencies of opinion amongst 
philosophers. Objective certainty shall, how- 
ever, be considered indirectly as the basis, upon 
which the solution of this controverted point 
chiefly depends. 

Let us cast our teaching on this subject into 
the form of a thesis. 

THESIS 8 

Metaphysical, physical and moral cer- 
titude differ essentially from one an- 
other, and form a descending scale of 
intellectual assents. 

Our thesis implies two things ; first, that meta- 
physical, physical and moral certitude differ in 
some essential element ; and secondly, that one 
surpasses another in perfection. 

In the proof it will be found convenient to 
take the two parts together. The proposition is 
shown thus : Certitude takes its character from 
its grounds of assent. For it is determined by 
them, and therefore depends upon them for, its 



72 Certitude 

firmness, just as the solidity of a bridge depends 
on the strength of the piers on which it rests. 
Such then will be the assent, as are the motives 
on which it is yielded. Hence if these motives 
are of three kinds, each differing from the other 
in something essential, the intellectual adherence 
produced by them will likewise differ essentially. 
That the motives of assent are essentially dis- 
similar, will be readily granted on a mere in- 
spection of them : for metaphysical motives are 
drawn from the very nature or idea of the truth 
affirmed. Hence they are of an altogether ab- 
solute character and utterly unchangeable. The 
physical motives, on the other hand, are consti- 
tuted by the laws of nature, and the moral, by 
certain tendencies governing free agents. Hence 
both are conditioned, and therefore essentially 
weaker than those of the metaphysical order. 
But there also exists an essential difference be- 
tween the physical laws and the moral instincts, 
in so far as the former are controllable only by 
a power of infinite wisdom and goodness, whereas 
the latter are subject to the free will of finite 
beings. Consequently, as the will of God and 
that of man differ essentially, so do likewise the 
two kinds of certitude referred to these wills as 
conditions. 



Properties of Certitude 73 



Section 2 

The Three Orders of Certitude not Species 
Properly so Called 

Summary: Thesis: certitude is an analogous, not a 
univocal term, the analogy being that of 
"intrinsic attribution" — Meaning of uni- 
vocal, equivocal and analogous terms — 
Analogy of attribution and proportion — 
Proof of thesis — Argument of opponents 
that metaphysical, physical and moral cer- 
titude are true species and our comment. 

56. There is then an essential difference be- 
tween metaphysical, physical and moral certitude 
in such wise, that metaphysical certitude excels 
the other two, and physical takes precedence of 
moral. Whence it follows that these three kinds 
of assent may be called essentially different or- 
ders or grades of certitude ; whether they may 
also be termed species in the strict sense of the 
word, we shall endeavor to settle in the next 
thesis. 

THESIS 9 

The name certitude is applied to as- 
sent given on metaphysical, physical 
and moral grounds, not univocally 
but analogically, the analogy in this 
case being that known as analogy of 



74 Certitude 

follows that the three orders of certi- 
tude are not species in the technical 
sense of the word. 

57. UnivocaJ, equivocal and analogous 
terms defined. Before we prove our thesis, a 
regard for clearness obliges us to explain briefly, 
what is meant by univocal, equivocal and analo- 
gous terms, as well as to assign the various divi- 
sions of analogy. 

A univocal term is one which signifies some- 
thing common to several objects and predicable 
of all of them in exactly the same way. Thus 
"animal" is such a term in reference to men and 
brute beasts. 

Equivocal terms, on the other hand, are those 
which are affirmed of various subjects in en- 
tirely different meanings. Such a term is the 
word "mass," as referred to a quantity of matter 
and to a religious service. 

Analogous terms hold a middle place between 
the univocal and the equivocal; they are those 
which when predicated of divers subjects, ex- 
press notions that are partly the same and partly 
different. The adjective "gloomy," as applied 
to a man's look and to the weather, is of this sort. 

This capacity possessed by certain terms, of 
being ascribed to two or more objects with a 
meaning which is partly the same and partly 
different, is called analogy. 



Properties of Certitude 75 

Analogy is divided into analogy of attribution 
and of proportion, according as the ground for 
attributing the same name to divers things is 
either a simple relation, or else a resemblance 
of relations. But as this latter kind of analogy 
does not concern us here, we shall restrict our- 
selves to the explanation of the former. 

Analogy is said to be of attribution, when what 
is signified by the analogous term, is found in 
one of the subjects of predication (the principal) 
primarily and in its fulness, whilst in the others 
(the secondary) it is found only in so far as 
they bear some relation to the principal. This 
kind of analogy we find exemplified in the term 
"healthy," as applied to animals and food. For 
"healthy" is predicated primarily of animal or- 
ganisms ; it is attributed to food only secondarily, 
because it produces health in animals. 

Analogy of attribution is again subdivided into 
extrinsic and intrinsic. It is extrinsic, when 
what is expressed by the analogous term, is in- 
trinsic to the principal subject of predication 
only, but extrinsic to the others, to which it is 
ascribed on account of some relation to the prin- 
cipal. The adjective "healthy," as related to 
animals and food, will likewise serve to illustrate 
this definition. 

Analogy is said to be of intrinsic attribution, 
when what is signified by the common term is, 
indeed, intrinsic to all the subjects of predica- 



y6 Certitude 

tion, but when the manner in which it exists in 
each of them is essentially different. Thus both 
God and creatures are truly "being"; but "be- 
ing" as found in God, is independent, uncondi- 
tioned and infinitely perfect, whereas, in creatures, 
it is dependent, conditioned and imperfect. 

With these remarks premised, let us now pro- 
ceed to the first of the three parts of our thesis, 
in which we state that the name certitude is ap- 
plied to assent given on metaphysical, physical 
and moral grounds not univocally, but anal- 
ogously. 

580 The argument we give in proof of this 
part, is based on the nature of univocal and 
analogous concepts. It proceeds thus : In order 
that a concept may be univocal in the strict sense 
of the word, it must be applied to the objects 
of which predication is made, in entirely the 
same meaning. Such, however, is not the case 
in the matter under discussion. For although, 
what is objectively certain or true, always im- 
plies some sort of necessity, yet this necessity 
is by no means the same in every proposition; 
for metaphysical necessity is absolute, whereas 
physical and moral are conditioned, the condition 
in each case being essentially different. Hence 
necessity and certainty are not affirmed in alto- 
gether the same sense, of propositions enunci- 
ating metaphysical, physical and moral truths 
and therefore one of the elements of genuine 



Properties of Certitude JJ 



univocation is wanting. Thus, when I say, "It 
is certain that two and two are four" — "It is 
certain that this spark will burn me" and, "It 
is certain that this man will not tell a lie," the 
word "certain" varies in signification in each 
sentence. And since (objective) certainty and 
(subjective) certitude are correlatives, the latter 
being determined by the former, it follows that 
(subjective) certitude is referred to the various 
orders of intellectual assent, not univocally, but 
analogically, that is, in a sense partly the same 
and partly different. 

59. We now come to the proof of the second 
part of the thesis, namely, that the analogy 
spoken of above, is analogy of "intrinsic attribu- 
tion." For this kind of analogy, as just stated, 
we require first, that the analogous term express 
a concept, intrinsically constitutive of the two 
(or more) subjects to which it is attributed; and 
secondly, that the reality represented by this 
concept as found in one of the subjects, be essen- 
tially dependent on the same reality as realized in 
the other. 

It is only this second requisite for intrinsic 
analogy of attribution which calls for a little 
further explanation here. To see how it applies 
in the present matter, call to mind that meta- 
physical certitude, within its own sphere of certi- 
tude, is absolute and independent, being alto- 
gether unconditioned; whereas physical and 



f& Certitude 

moral certitude depend on metaphysical in more 
than one way. For, in the first place, as fully 
explained elsewhere, no certain judgment can 
be formed without the implicit assertion of the 
three so called fundamental truths, viz., the 
primary principle of all knowledge or the prin- 
ciple of contradiction, the first fact in all cog- 
nition or the existence of the thinking subject, 
and the primary condition of all knowledge or 
the capacity of the mind for knowing the truth, 
all of which belong to the metaphysical order. 

Again, physical and moral certitude would lose 
all their meaning without the absolutely certain 
knowledge of the dependence of the physical and 
moral order upon a Creator, infinitely wise and 
holy, whose kind Providence extends even from 
end to end. 

Hence it follows that physical and moral certi- 
tude, resting essentially upon metaphysical for 
their firmness, are certitude only by what is 
known as "analogy of intrinsic attribution," that 
is to say, in entire subordination to perfect or 
metaphysical certitude. 

60. From what has been said hitherto, the 
third part of our thesis, viz., that the three or- 
ders of certitude cannot be termed species prop- 
erly so called, follows as an immediate inference. 
For species properly so called suppose a genus 
properly so called. Now* a genus in the strict 
sense is understood to be a univocal concept, 



Properties of Certitude 79 

that is to say, a concept which is applicable to 
the things of which it is predicated, without any 
variation of meaning. But the concept certitude 
falls short of this requirement. Hence it is that 
we should speak of three orders or grades of 
certitude rather than of three species without 
any qualification. There would, however, be no 
objection to calling certitude a quasi-genus and 
the three orders included under it gwa^'-species. 

For this reason we do not mean to quarrel 
with those who call the three kinds of certitude, 
species, all the more so, as they seem to use the 
term chiefly to indicate that there is an essential 
difference between metaphysical, physical and 
moral certitude, as against certain philosophers 
who discard any diversity in certain assents. 

61. A difficulty met. It might not be out of 
place here, just to touch upon the chief argu- 
ment given for three species of certitude, espe- 
cially as we have made use of nearly the same 
process of reasoning for establishing our own 
position. 

But before doing so, we must briefly explain 
an expression, which we often hear used in this 
connection, and which suggests nothing very 
definite in English, namely the expression "for- 
mal object of a faculty and its act." By this 
formal object, as here understood, is meant the 
object to which a faculty and its act are directed 
and which determines them, thus giving them 



80 Certitude 

their peculiar character and form. It is, as it 
were, the form-giving object. Thus the formal 
object of sight is color; of hearing, sound; and 
of the intellect, the essences of things. Hence 
the formal object of certitude will be that to 
which certain assent is directed, and which de- 
termines it, namely the motives or grounds of 
intellectual adherence. 

Let us now pass to the argument of those who 
uphold three species of certitude. They tell us, 
that just as an instrument, say a saw or a hatchet, 
takes the peculiar form or shape it may happen 
to have, from the use to which it is to be put ; 
so, in a similar manner, the faculties and their 
acts receive their own peculiar and specific form 
or character, from the formal object for which 
they are destined. For the faculties and their 
acts are, so to speak, instruments for apprehend- 
ing or seizing the object to which they relate. 
Since, then, the formal objects or grounds of 
certitude according to these philosophers are of 
three kinds and differ specifically from each 
other, it follows that there must be three species 
of certitude. 

We admit this argument, with the exceptior 
that in our opinion, there seems to be an essential 
difference in the generic element of certitude it- 
self which the other side either overlooks, or does 
not consider of sufficient importance to empha- 
size. 



Properties of Certitude 81 

ARTICLE 5 

Accidental Degrees of Certitude 

Summary: Thesis: certitude does not admit degrees 
as regards its negative element, but ad- 
mits degrees as regards the positive ele- 
ment — Proof of thesis — The exclusion of 
error admits degrees in its causes — The 
firmness of the exclusion of error admits 
of degrees in itself — A difficulty answered 
— Summing up. 

62. The question now arises; are there any 
differences or variations of intellectual assent 
within the boundaries of each of the three orders 
of certitude? If there are, they will, of course, 
be merely accidental, just as the differences be- 
tween two animals of the same kind, say, 
between two horses, are only accidental. We 
ask then — to take a definite example — is it pos- 
sible for the same metaphysical truth, v. g. 
"Every effect must have a cause," to be more 
certain to one mind than to another. We an- 
swer that it is. Let us first state our doctrine 
concisely in a thesis. 

THESIS 10 

Certain assent, if viewed negatively, 
that is, as excluding the fear of error, 
admits no accidental degrees; but if 



82 Certitude 

regarded on its positive side, namely 
as the firm adherence to truth, it is 
subject to variations in each of the 
three orders of certitude. 

The wording of this thesis supposes that cer- 
tain assent can be considered from a twofold 
standpoint, a negative and a positive. To be 
convinced of this, it is enough, merely to glance 
at the definition of certitude as the firm adher- 
ence to one of two contradictory statements 
without any fear of the other being true. 

The thesis then embraces two parts, in the first 
of which we shall prove that certitude consid- 
ered negatively admits of no degrees or varia- 
tions ; and in the second, that if taken positively, 
it does. 

Proof of the first part, that certitude in re- 
spect to its negative element admits of no de- 
grees. 

The negative element of certitude consists in 
this, that all doubt, hesitancy and dread of being 
mistaken has been banished. Certitude then, 
viewed on its negative side, is a negation pure 
and simple, a total absence of whatever is at 
variance with the firmness of mental adherence 
required by the order of certitude of which there 
is question. Now a negation which is total, and 
hence the complete and not the merely partial 
absence of something, does not admit of degrees. 



Properties of Certitude 83 

Thus complete darkness implies the removal of 
even the slightest trace of light; a perfect 
vacuum supposes every, even the last, particle of 
air, to have been exhausted. Complete dark- 
ness or a perfect vacuum may be destroyed, but 
neither can be intensified. The same holds true 
as regards the exclusion of doubt in true and 
genuine certitude. It may cease altogether by 
the mind losing hold on the grounds shutting out 
doubt ; but it cannot be increased. 

The negative element of certitude is sometimes 
likened to an indivisible mathematical point : for 
such a point cannot be diminished or brought to 
greater perfection: any attempt to do so even 
in thought, would involve us in a contradiction. 
In the Schoolmen's dialect, this idea is often con- 
veyed by saying, "Certitudo stat in (puncto) in- 
divisibili," that is to say, "Certitude is like a 
mathematical point without extension." 

Let us now take up the second part of our 
thesis, in which we inquire into the positive ele- 
ment of certitude, namely the firm adherence to 
truth. We wish to know then, whether this 
admits of degrees in each of the three orders of 
certitude, or whether it, too, like the negative 
element is comparable to an indivisible math- 
ematical point. Is Shakespeare's dictum, "To 
make assurance doubly sure," to be taken meta- 
phorically or literally? Is it possible for the 
certain assent of one man to some truth to be 



84 Certitude 

more intense and firm than that of another to 
the same truth ? or, can the same person be more 
certain of a statement at one time than at an- 
other, just as he can be more obliging, virtuous, 
accomplished at one period of his life than at 
another ? 

We answer that certitude viewed on its posi- 
tive side can be intensified in each of its three 
essential grades. We show it thus : 

Certitude on its positive side will admit of 
accidental degrees, if on the one hand, adherence 
to truth is capable of being intensified, and if on 
the other, there are causes at work in the acqui- 
sition of certitude, which can bring about varia- 
tions in the intensity of intellectual assent. 

Now that mental adherence can be intensified 
or perfected, cannot be doubted, since, on the 
one hand, it is something positive in its nature, 
and on the other, its perfectibility does not im- 
ply any contradiction in its concept, as does that 
of other positive notions, which have in them- 
selves a superlative meaning, for instance, right, 
chief, extreme, universal, equal and the like. 
For where is there anything impossible in the 
idea of one thing adhering more or less closely 
to another? 

There are, furthermore, causes to produce a 
variation in the intensity of the intellectual as- 
sent : namely the motives of assent and the pres- 
sure of the will, brought to bear upon the think- 



Properties of Certitude 85 

ing agent. For both these motives and the will- 
pressure admit of more and less; hence also the 
effect, to which they give rise, namely the assent 
of the mind; since the effect varies as the cause 
whenever it is capable of gradations. Thus, the 
greater the conflagration is, the more intense will 
be the heat which it generates. 

As to the motives of assent, it can be readily 
seen, that they may be both increased in number, 
and intensified from within by being rendered 
clearer and more distinct. 

For the same truth can be shown by one, two, 
three or still more solid and unexceptional 
proofs. Thus, I can become assured v. g. that 
my friend has a high fever by what he tells me, 
or by what I see myself, or from the testimony 
of the physician, or perhaps in other ways. 

Again, there may be many gradations and 
shades in the clearness and definiteness of the 
ideas which go to constitute the same certain 
judgment. Thus, my ideas may be clearer to- 
day than they were yesterday, because I am more 
attentive or less fatigued to-day, or because I 
have looked more closely into the matter since 
yesterday. I was certain yesterday as I am to- 
day; but to-day I cling more vigorously to the 
truth than I did yesterday. A youthful student 
may be perfectly certain of all the propositions 
in Euclid; but it is highly probable that in ma- 
turer life, when he is a professor of mathematics, 



86 Certitude 

his knowledge of these same propositions will 
not only have been broadened, but also clarified. 
Again, the clearness and precision of our ideas 
depends upon each one's intellectual caliber. 
One man may be a genius, another a person of 
mediocre talent. The latter understands the 
arguments advanced for some assertion suffi- 
ciently to be truly certain; but the other, the 
eagle-eyed, has a much more lucid and discrimi- 
nating insight into them, and hence he holds to 
the truth with a much tighter grasp. 

As regards the stress of the will brought to 
bear upon intellectual assent, it is plain that it 
too can vary not only in different individuals in 
respect to the same statement; but one and the 
same person may be differently influenced by 
the same truth to-day and to-morrow according 
to the changing affections of the will. 

That the will can act upon the intellect, there 
can be no doubt ; it is a fact clearly attested by 
consciousness. True, the will cannot elicit intel- 
lectual assent; for it is a volitional, and hence a 
non-intellectual faculty. Yet, it can urge on the 
intellect to a more accurate scrutiny of the mo- 
tives of assent, as it is likely to do, whenever a 
statement proposed for approval or rejection, is 
of great importance or very pleasing to the think- 
ing subject. If the contrary happens, that is, if 
there is question of an unpalatable truth, the 
will is liable at times to weaken the intellectual 



Properties of Certitude 87 

assent by inducing the mind to look away from 
the distasteful facts or arguments and close its 
eyes to their evidence. Thus suppose that your 
country is at war with another nation and that 
well authenticated dispatches announce a victory. 
You are sure ; but because the news pleases you, 
you give yourself up to this delightful certainty 
with much greater intensity of assent, than you 
would have done, if the report resting on similar 
grounds had told of defeat. 

All we have hitherto said, proves that certain 
assent admits of accidental degrees. 

Let us now add a few remarks by way of 
corollaries in further elucidation of the previous 
thesis. 

63. The exclusion of error admits of de- 
grees in its causes. Since the same causes 
which determine the positive adherence of the 
mind, likewise exclude the fear of error, it fol- 
lows, that the foundation to which the exclusion 
of error is due, is variable; and this is some- 
times expressed by saying that the exclusion of 
error allows of more or less, if not in itself 
(formally), at least in its causes or funda- 
mentally. 

Let us illustrate this by a comparison. A bul- 
let may be driven out of the barrel of a gun by 
a greater or less charge of powder. In either 
case, the negative result produced by the charge 
is the same, namely the absence of the bullet 



88 Certitude 

from the barrel; but the cause of this removal, 
namely the larger or smaller quantity of the ex- 
plosive, varies. The same example incidentally 
also shows, that the positive effects obtained in 
the case, as, the intensity of the report and the 
velocity of the projected ball, are in exact pro- 
portion to the propelling cause. 

64. The firmness of the exclusion of doubt 
admits degrees in itself. If, however, we re- 
gard, not precisely the exclusion of doubt as 
such, but the firmness of this exclusion, then, 
we may rightly say, that this latter allows of 
more or less in itself (formally), and not merely 
in its causes. For, on the one hand, the firm- 
ness of the exclusion of doubt is perfectible, 
being something positive, and on the other, it 
owes its origin to varying causes, the same that 
produce the positive assent. Suppose that the 
firmness of the exclusion of doubt rests in some 
particular case on three grounds, such that each 
of them proves the statement in question to evi- 
dence. I may forget one of them altogether, 
and another may become hazy and uncertain; 
yet as I have still one motive left, my certitude 
in regard to that statement endures ; whereas 
with the two reasons on which my mind has now 
lost its hold, I should again lapse into a state of 
doubt respecting the truth of which I possessed 
genuine certitude before. Thus we can see that 
the firmness of the exclusion of doubt is itself 



Properties of Certitude 89 

capable of degrees ; since an unsettled state of 
mind is more decidedly excluded by three mo- 
tives of assent than by two or one. 

65. A difficulty cleared up. In conclusion, 
let us answer an objection which is often brought 
up against this second part of the thesis. 

It is claimed that the firmness of assent with 
which one holds to some statement cannot admit 
of any degrees, because it is determined by the 
perceived impossibility of the opposite of the 
statement under consideration. Now impossi- 
bility being negative in its nature, and hence not 
susceptible of variations, it follows (say our op- 
ponents), that the firmness of the assent corre- 
sponding to it, does not admit of more or less, 
and is consequently like an indivisible math- 
ematical point. We reply to this exception 
taken to our doctrine that the impossibility of 
the opposite itself rests on the necessity of the 
perceived connection between the subject and 
the predicate. For it is only through this latter 
that the impossibility of the opposite becomes in- 
telligible. Now this necessity, in its turn, is 
brought home to the mind through one or more 
grounds or motives of assent. Whence we in- 
fer that the firmness of the intellectual adherence 
to truth is based directly and immediately upon 
the motives of assent as showing forth the neces- 
sary connection between subject and predicate, 
and only secondarily and indirectly upon the im- 



90 Certitude 

possibility of the opposite. Since then these 
motives for the mind's acceptance of a proposi- 
tion admit of more or less, it follows that the 
positive assent, directly depending on them, does 
so in like manner. 

It will be seen from the above that the im- 
possibility of the opposite is not so much a mo- 
tive of certain assent as a test of the genuineness 
of the necessity involved in every certain judg- 
ment, and an aid in grasping this necessity. 
Let us illustrate by a similitude what we have 
just said, viz., that assent can vary, although 
the necessity of the truth and the impossibility 
of its opposite are one and indivisible, and hence 
incapable of degrees. 

All creation proclaims the Wisdom of God, a 
Divine attribute which in itself is simple and 
indivisible. The more of God's wonderful 
works we study, the more we admire his Wis- 
dom, because, although entirely simple and in- 
divisible in itself, yet this perfection manifests 
itself to us through various channels. In a simi- 
lar manner, the necessity of a proposition and 
the impossibility of its contradictory, .though 
likewise one and indivisible, yet can be mani- 
fested from various view-points and thus impress 
themselves more or less upon the mind. 

But there is another flaw in the above dif- 
ficulty, namely the unwarranted assumption, that 
the impossibility of the opposite is insusceptible 



Properties of Certitude 91 

of variations under any aspect. True, reference 
to this additional weak spot is not needed for 
the solution of the difficulty just proposed: yet, 
it is good to call attention to it, on account of 
the close connection of the principle involved 
with other kindred questions. 

As regards this assumption we say, in the first 
place, that it comes with a very bad grace from 
our opponents who admit that the objective 
necessity of the truth is threefold; viz., meta- 
physical, physical and moral. For if so, the im- 
possibility of the opposite is likewise threefold, 
since necessity and impossibility, as here under- 
stood, are correlatives, and hence imply one 
another. 

But, say our antagonists, is not the impossi- 
bility of the contrary a negation? How then can 
it have degrees? 

To this rejoinder we answer that, when we 
say a negation allows of no degrees, we mean a 
negation which is total and complete. If it is 
not thus entire, it is susceptible of more or less, 
just as a vacuum — if taken to be space from 
which the air has been exhausted to a very high 
degree — can be more or less perfect. 

Now, the impossibility of the contrary may 
be considered in a twofold relationship. It may 
be either referred to each of the orders of cer- 
tainty in particular, and then it can have no 
variations ; for the possibility of the opposite 

7 



92 Certitude 

corresponding to each of these orders is excluded 
totally: or it may relate to certainty in general 
viewed generically ; then, I say, it does not de- 
note complete and absolute negation or ex- 
clusion ; but it prescinds from the circumstance 
whether the possibility excluded be metaphysical, 
physical or moral, (i. e., absolute or conditional) ; 
and hence, like certainty itself, it can be sub- 
divided into three essential orders. 

66. Summing up. To conclude, the process 
by which certitude is engendered in the mind, 
seems to be the following : The mind holds two 
concepts (subject and predicate) before its in- 
tellectual gaze, in order to ascertain their agree- 
ment or disagreement, and then casts about for 
reasons to establish the relation between the two. 
It finds, let us suppose, one or more appropriate 
grounds showing forth the necessity or evidence 
of the looked for connection as well as the im- 
possibility of the opposite. The evidence per- 
ceived impels the intellect to yield assent by ad- 
hering firmly to the truth, and at the same time 
expels all doubt or fear of error : thus the think- 
ing being comes finally to rest satisfied in the full 
enjoyment of truth, and this is to possess perfect 
certitude. 

THE END 



ALPHABETICAL INDEX. 

NUMBERS REFER TO THE PAGES. 

Analogous terms defined, 74. 

Analogy of attribution and proportion, 75; extrinsic 
and intrinsic analogy of attribution, 75. 

Certitude defined, 1, 6; how it differs from certainty, 
8; certitude purely subjective, and certitude at 
once subjective and objective, 6; objective cer- 
titude, 7; metaphysical certitude, 9; physical 
certitude, 10; moral certitude, 12; moral certi- 
tude in the wider sense, 17; absolute certitude, 
18; hypothetical certitude, 18; natural and phil- 
osophical certitude, 19; requisites for certitude; 
first requisite, assent to truth, 20; second 
requisite, infallible motives, 26; third requi- 
site, evidence of infallible motives, 29; prop- 
erties of certitude: metaphysical certitude ab- 
solute certitude, 35; metaphysical certitude the 
only absolute certitute, 37; physical and moral 
certitude though hypothetical, still true certi- 
tude, 40; confirmation from common sense, 
58; essential grades of certitude, 70; meta- 
physical, physical and moral certitude essen- 
tially different orders of certitude, one sur- 
passing the other, 70; they are certitude not 
univocally, but analogously, jy, they are not 
species properly so called, 73; accidental de- 
grees of certitude, 81; certitude viewed nega- 
tively does not admit of degrees, 82; certitude 
viewed positively admits of degrees, 83; ex- 
clusion of doubt admits of degrees in its 
causes, 87; the firmness of the exclusion of 
doubt admits of degrees in itself. 88. 

93 



94 Alphabetical Index 

Common Sense, meaning of, 59; signs of judgments 
of common sense, 61. 

Doubt, definition of, 3; negative and positive doubt, 3. 

Evidence, notion of, 30; objective and subjective, 30. 

Equivocal terms defined, 74. 

Formal object of act and faculty; meaning of, 79. 

Grounds of a statement twofold, 27. 

Genus, meaning of, 78. 

Hypothetical propositions, their force, 41. 

Ignorance, definition of, 2; complete and partial, 2. 

Laws, physical, 11; moral, 12; in what sense neces- 
sary, 46. 

Metaphysical certitude, 9. 

Moral certitude, 12; moral certitude in the wider 
sense, 17; moral laws, 15; their necessity, 46. 

Object; formal object of a faculty and its act, 79. 

Opinion defined, 7. 

Physical certitude, 10; physical laws, 11; their neces- 
sity, 46. 

Propositions hypothetical, their force, 41. 

Sense, common, meaning of, 59; signs of judgments 
of common sense, 61. 

Skepticism the result of denying that certitude is 
assent to truth, 25. 

Stare in indivisibili, meaning of phrase, 83. 

Suspicion described, 5. 

Univocal terms defined, 74. 



